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Reparations Decisions and Dilemmas
By NAOMI ROHT-ARRIAZA*
It is a basic maxim of law that harms should be remedied. All
legal systems allow for redress of wrongs, in some form. International
human rights law is no exception. The International Bill of Rights'
declares a right to a remedy for violations of human rights. States are
obliged to provide remedies for violations, both as a matter of treaty
law and as part of the general rules of state responsibility. Starting in
1989, the U.N. Human Rights Commission and its Sub-Commission
have formulated draft Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to
a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Violations of International
Human Rights and Humanitarian Law (Principles),2 which outline
restitution, rehabilitation, compensation and satisfaction as
interlinked but distinct obligations on states. The draft Principles,
after years of discussion and massaging, are to be considered again by
the Commission in 2004. In addition, the statute of the newly-created
International Criminal Court allows for individual offenders to pay
reparations to victims, as well as for the creation of a trust fund to be
used where awards from individuals are impracticable.
* Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of Law. I would like
to acknowledge the able research assistance of Lee Cabatingan, including a great deal
of the writing of Part IV(B)(a), and of Carlos Flores. A shorter version of this article
will appear in MY NEIGHBOR, MY ENEMY (E. Stover & H. Weinstein eds.,
forthcoming 2004).
1. The International Bill of Rights consists of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. See DAVID
WEISSBRODT ET AL., INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW, POLICY AND PROCESS
(3d ed. 2002).
2. Draft Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and
Reparation for Victims of Violations of International Human Rights and
Humanitarian Law, U.N. ESCOR, 56th Sess., Annex at 6-7, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/2000/62 (2000) [hereinafter Principles], available at
<www.unhchr.chlhuridocda/huridoca.nsf/e06a5300f90fa0238025668700518ca4/ 42bdlb
d544910ae3802568a20060e21f/$FILE/G0010236.pdf> (visited Jan. 17, 2004). The
Principles are appended to this article.
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And yet, few reparations have actually been paid in the wake of
mass atrocities. Germany, of course, paid sizeable reparations for
Nazi-era crimes, and the United States eventually paid reparations to
surviving Japanese-American internees. But other World War II
claims, like those of slave laborers and sex slaves, have fared less well.
Outside the context of the Second World War, examples of large-
scale reparations programs become scarcer. Chile and Argentina
provided compensation, rehabilitation and services to some (but not
all) of the victims of their respective military dictatorships. The
United Nations set up a compensation mechanism for victims of
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, some of whom could be characterized as
victims of human rights violations. The ad hoc International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda considered a modest compensation program,
but quickly pulled back and discontinued it. The "truth commissions"
of South Africa, Guatemala, El Salvador and Panama have
recommended more or less extensive reparations programs, but to
date the governments of those countries have been slow to act on
their proposals. Rwanda has an elaborate plan for reparations, but it
is too soon to tell if it will be implemented.
Why the discrepancy between word and deed? If reparations are
so universally accepted as part of a state's human rights obligations,
why have so few states emerging from periods of conflict or mass
atrocity put viable programs into place? This article will consider
some of the difficulties in thinking about reparations after mass
atrocities, both in general and in the context of poor countries with
many victims and multiple claims on scarce resources. It surveys legal
guideposts and past practice for ideas and insights that might be
applicable in the mass atrocity context. A final section will propose
three distinct yet interrelated ways of thinking about reparations in
this context, all of which eschew the classic view of individual, court-
ordered reparations in favor of other approaches.
I. Defining Reparations
There is a basic paradox at the heart of reparations: they are
intended to return the victim to the position he or she would have
been in had the violations not occurred-something that is impossible
to do. What could replace lost health and serenity; the loss of a loved
one or of a whole extended family; a whole generation of friends; the
destruction of home and culture and community and peace?
Nonetheless, we work with the tools at hand. These are both material
and moral: reparations for the body to enable survival, reparations for
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the spirit and the sense of justice, and some sense of a decorous and
secure future for future generations. They are both individual and
collective. Reparations are the embodiment of a society's
recognition, remorse and atonement for harms inflicted. This
atonement quality separates reparations from mere post-conflict
settlements.3
Material reparations for an individual may include the restitution
of access, and title to, property taken or lost, a job or freedom, a
pension or a person's good name. Material reparations may also
include medical, psychiatric or occupational therapy aimed at
rehabilitation. They may encompass monetary compensation, in the
form of a lump-sum, a pension, or a package of services, for the victim
and for the survivors of those killed. For collectivities, restitution-of
cultural or religious property, of communal lands, of destroyed public
buildings, education or health facilities-and compensation in the
form of money or services to the community are options.
Moral reparations are as important-often more important-
than material ones. They cover a wide range of measures, most
having to do with a felt need for telling the story, for justice, and for
measures to avoid repetition. These are sometimes grouped under
the heading of "satisfaction." They may include disclosure of the
facts of a victim's mistreatment or a loved one's death, disclosure of
the names and positions of those responsible and of the patterns of
repression. They may include official acknowledgement that
government agents wronged the victims, and an apology. They may
include, most importantly for many victims, that those responsible
suffer consequences, whether criminal, civil or administrative-that
they are brought to justice, and removed from positions of power.
Moral reparations may also be as basic as the identification and
exhumation of the bodies of victims, and assistance in reburials and
culturally appropriate mourning ceremonies. Assistance with finding
the bodies of the disappeared (that is, those kidnapped and
surreptitiously killed, usually by security forces) is particularly key.
These moral reparations also have a collective aspect, when entire
communities dedicate memorials or markers to their dead. Other
collective measures of moral reparation may include days of
remembrance, parks or other public monuments, renaming of streets
or schools, preservation of archives or of repressive sites as museums
3. Roy L. Brooks, Reflections on Reparations, in POLITICS AND THE PAST: ON
REPAIRING HISTORICAL INJUSTICES 117 (John Torpey ed., 2003).
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or other ways of creating public memory. Reform of education, re-
writing of history texts, education in human rights and tolerance are
all encompassed within the idea of "guarantees of non-repetition."
So too, in a broader sense, are reform of courts, police and military
forces and the like.
Reparations are generally framed as repair for past damage,
putting the victim back where he or she would have been had the
wrong not occurred. The classical view of reparations is rooted in
both tort law and the law of state responsibility, which obligates states
to repair harm they cause to other states. But they are not simply
backward-looking. They also right a balance going forward. Victims
of human rights violations are often marginalized and blamed for
their own disaster. No one wants to associate with a suspect figure,
lest the contagion spread and they become suspect themselves. In
Latin America, por algo serd ("they must have done something") was
the watchword among the silent and terrorized majority watching
their neighbors and colleagues disappear. Those killed were often
derided as subversives and terrorists, worthy of no better fate. Often,
in the midst of state terror or civil conflict, families could not even
reclaim the bodies of their dead loved ones. The trauma is passed on
to the next generations, spawning a legacy of violence and
dysfunction that may persist for many years.
Under these circumstances, reparations serve a dual function.
They aim to recompense for loss and to restore the good name of
those defamed, but also to reintegrate the marginalized and isolated
into society in order to allow them to be part of rebuilding the
country. They aim to rebuild and replace burnt-out buildings and
destroyed infrastructure, but also to create the conditions for poor
communities to prosper, not simply to resume their prior poverty.
Moral reparations, too, serve this dual purpose: they aim to expose
and punish those responsible, but also to minimize their power and
role in the post-conflict society. After all, if the local thugs are still in
charge, few things will change.
II. The Legal Basis for Reparations of Human Rights Violations
The basic human rights instruments encompass a "right to a
remedy." The Universal Declaration of Human Rights holds that
"[e]veryone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent
national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted
[Vol. 27:157
2004] Reparations Decisions and Dilemmas 161
him by the constitution or by law."4 The International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights requires parties to "ensure that any person
whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized are violated shall have
an effective remedy, notwithstanding that the violation has been
committed by persons acting in an official capacity"' and to provide
compensation for unlawful detention 6 or wrongful conviction. The
European and Inter-American Conventions have similar provisions.'
Specialized conventions also provide for rights to a remedy, often
explicitly including compensation. The Convention on the
Elimination of Racial Discrimination requires state parties to:
[A]ssure to everyone within their jurisdiction effective protection
and remedies, through the competent national tribunals and other
State institutions against any acts of racial discrimination which
violate his human rights and fundamental freedoms contrary to this
Convention, as well as the right to seek from such tribunals just and
adequate reparation or satisfaction for any damage suffered as a
result of such discrimination.9
The Convention Against Torture's Article 14 reads:
Each State Party shall ensure in its legal system that the victim of
an act of torture obtains redress and has an enforceable right to fair
and adequate compensation, including the means for as full
rehabilitation as possible. In the event of the death of the victim as
a result of an act of torture, his dependents shall be entitled to
compensation.'°
The Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearances" has
4. Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 8, G.A. Res. 217A (111), U.N.
GAOR, 3d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
5. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 2(3), G.A. Res.
2200A (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966),
999 U.N.T.S. 171.
6. Id. art. 9(5).
7. Id. art. 14(6).
8. American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, arts. 8 (right to fair
trial), 25 (right to judicial protection), O.A.S. Treaty Series No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S.
123, 147-48, 151; European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, arts. 6 (right to fair and public hearing), 13
(right to effective remedy), 213 U.N.T.S. 222, 228, 232.
9. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Dec.
21, 1965, art. 6, 660 U.N.T.S. 195.
10. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment art. 14, G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp.
No. 51, at 197, U.N. DOC. A/39/51 (1984).
11. Inter-American Convention on the Forced Disappearance of Persons arts. 10,
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similar provisions. The laws of war provide for criminal prosecution
of certain war crimes, and for the right of families to know the fate of
their relatives."
Non-binding "soft law" instruments also specify the need to
provide redress for violations of rights. In 1985, the General
Assembly unanimously adopted the Declaration of Basic Principles of
Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power, calling on the state
to provide restitution when public officials or other agents acting in
an official or quasi-official capacity have violated national criminal
laws. 3  The U.N. Declaration on Enforced and Involuntary
Disappearances also requires individual civil liability as well as
proclaiming the obligation of the state to investigate the crimes and
compensate victims and their families. 4
The most recent attempt to codify the right to reparation began
in 1989, when the U.N. Sub-Commission on Prevention of
Discrimination and protection of Minorities (now renamed Sub-
Commission on Human Rights) appointed Theo van Boven to
examine the issue of remedies for gross violations of human rights.
After a series of expert meetings, seminars, requests to states for
comments and the like, a body of draft Principles was presented to
the Commission on Human Rights at its 1994 session. The
Commission, apparently concerned about the scope of the
obligations, sent it back for more work. A new rapporteur, M. Cherif
Bassiouni, was named, and after another two years of work a revised
version is now again ready for consideration. The October 2003 draft
of the Principles is contained in an Appendix to this article.
The Principles are intended to restate and gather up existing law
11, O.A.S. Doc. GA/Res. 1256 (XXIV-0/94), 33 I.L.M. 1529, 1532 (entered into force
March 28, 1996).
12. See, e.g., Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 147 (grave breaches), 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287,
388; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Wounded and Sick in Armed
Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, arts. 15, 16, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31, 40-42;
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded and Sick and
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, arts. 18, 19, 6 U.S.T.
3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85, 96-98; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12
August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed
Conflicts, June 8, 1977, arts. 32, 33 (search for missing, notification to families), 1125
U.N.T.S 3, 19-20 [hereinafter Additional Protocol I].
13. G.A. Res. 40/34, U.N. GAOR, 40th Sess., Supp. No. 53, at 213, U.N. Doc.
A/40/53 (1985).
14. G.A. Res. 47/133, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 207, U.N. Doc.
A/47/49 (1992).
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and practice, not to make new law. States have raised a number of
continuing concerns with their scope, while agreeing with their basic
thrust. One recurring issue involves the types of violations that are
subject to reparations. An initial draft of the Principles referred to
"gross violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms," but the
term proved difficult to define. If certain violations were "gross," for
example genocide, torture, slavery, summary executions and the like,
and thus required the full scope of reparations, what about "non-
gross" violations? Were they then subject to a lesser standard,
notwithstanding the language of the human rights treaties that
required a remedy for all violations? And if not, why the distinction?
After a number of attempts to limit the principles (to jus cogens
violations, for example) the rapporteurs settled on pointing out the
separate obligation to submit for prosecution cases involving
"violations of international human rights and humanitarian law norms
that constitute crimes under international law."'5  In practice,
reparations in cases of massive violence or repression have been paid
only for a subset of the most egregious human rights violations.
Another issue that has caused a great deal of debate is whose
violations are subject to reparations. There is widespread agreement
that when state agents are involved, the state has a duty to provide
reparations. Even if their direct involvement cannot be proven,
where a state is complicit in the violations, or where a state fails to
use due diligence to investigate and prosecute the violations, the state
incurs responsibility.16 Similarly, when individuals commit violations,
these are generally actionable in domestic law as torts or civil wrongs,
and the individual is liable to the victims for damages. In practice,
individual perpetrators are hard to identify and to apprehend, and
often have few localizable assets. Should states have to provide
reparations even when official involvement cannot be proven or when
it takes the form of omissions rather than acts? In situations of
massive or systematic violations, with various militias and
paramilitary groups with differing levels of ties to the state running
amok, this question is particularly pertinent.
As a variant, what about the responsibility of outside, "third-
party" states which finance or arm the combatants or run covert
operations that result in widespread violations? The international
15. Principles, supra note 2, Annex at 6-7.
16. See Velsquez Rodriguez Case, Judgment of July, 29, 1988, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (ser. C) No. 4 at 154 (1988).
2004]
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law on the subject is murky, with standards ranging from "direct
control" to "complicity" to "ratification."' 7 States have been by and
large reluctant to approve principles that extend their liability much
beyond direct participation, while victims' groups have wanted to cast
as wide a net as possible. The current draft contains a weak
exhortation to states, but no obligation, in cases where the party
responsible cannot or will not meet the obligation to repair: states
"should endeavor to provide" reparations to the victims, and should
endeavor to establish national funds for reparation.
The current draft of the Principles covers violations of both
human rights and international humanitarian law (IHL or the law of
armed conflict). Some states have argued that IHL has no place in a
human rights instrument, because it is a separate body of law, and
because the reparations provisions of classic humanitarian law
treaties channel reparations for individuals through their states. But
this view ignores the increasing convergence of the two bodies of
law. 8  Many of the rights of non-combatants protected by
international humanitarian law are also violations of non-derogable
human rights provisions, and to exclude IHL violations runs the risk
that claimants for reparations will have to prove nonderogability in
every case. Moreover, IHL has long had involved moral reparations
like finding information on missing persons and the location of those
killed. 9 Most importantly, recent evolution of the law, including the
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, provides for
reparations for victims of war crimes, crimes against humanity and
genocide.2"
The current draft of the Principles adopts a victim-centered
approach to states' existing obligations to provide remedies, including
access to justice, reparation for harm, and access to factual
17. See United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran),
1980 I.C.J. 3 (May 24) (ratification); Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v.
U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27) (control).
18. See, e.g., Theodor Meron, The Convergence Between Human Rights and
Humanitarian Law, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN LAW: THE QUEST FOR
UNIVERSALITY (Daniel Warner ed., 1997).
19. Families have the right to be informed of the fate of missing relatives.
Additional Protocol I, supra note 12, art. 32. The parties to a conflict must search for
persons reported missing by an adverse party. Additional Protocol I, supra note 12,
art. 33. And lists showing the exact location and markings of graves, together with
particulars of the dead interred therein, must be exchanged. Additional Protocol I,
supra note 12, art. 34.
20. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 75, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.183/9 (1998).
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information concerning the violations. It sets out a long list of
possible forms of reparations, some more applicable to cases of mass
atrocities than others. By dividing the Principles into separate articles
on access to justice and on state-administered compensation schemes,
the draft mirrors the two main modalities or approaches to
reparations.
III. Modalities of Reparations
Reparations to victims can come about in one of two ways:
through complaints filed in the courts, or through specially designed
administrative schemes. Most reparations programs to date have had
elements of both; in a number of cases, settlements of court cases
have included or have triggered administrative compensation
schemes. I will take them up in turn.
A. Courts as Sites of Reparation
In theory, national courts serve as the first opportunity for
reparations in cases involving violations of human rights and
humanitarian law. Indeed, to even pursue a claim before most
international bodies, an applicant must exhaust domestic remedies.
In practice, national courts have not often served this purpose.
Periods of mass human rights violations or civil conflict almost always
involve inoperative courts, and it takes quite some time for courts to
assume an independent stance capable of finding powerful forces
(usually the government itself) liable for violations. Amnesty laws or
rules on statutes of limitations may close off the possibility of civil
claims as well as criminal prosecution. Even without these specific
limitations, procedural devices-like bonds required to file a civil
claim, or state or official immunities-hamper individual claims. In
most civil law systems, the victims or survivors find it advantageous to
become part of the state's criminal case, as partie civile, but their
damage claims then rise and fall with the success of the criminal
prosecution. For these reasons, there are few cases of individual civil
damage awards in national courts in the wake of mass violations."Courts located outside the country where the violations took
21. There are, of course, exceptions. For example, Daniel Tarnopolsky sued
Argentina for the disappearance of his family and won a multimillion dollar
judgment against the state itself and two individual defendants. See MARGUERITE
FEITLOWITZ, A LEXICON OF TERROR (1999). A number of Chilean torture victims
have also filed successful claims against the state.
2004]
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place have generally proven a better bet. One route has involved
transnational civil prosecutions under the U.S. Alien Tort Claims Act
(ATCA), which opens the federal courts to suits by aliens for torts in
violation of the law of nations.2   Under the ATCA, multi-million
dollar judgments or verdicts have been obtained against individual
torturers, ex-generals and heads of state, and war criminals in
Argentina, Bosnia, Ethiopia, Guatemala, the Philippines, El
Salvador, Chile and elsewhere, but few judgments have actually been
collected. Defendants with assets usually conceal them, and many
defendants have few assets to satisfy a judgment. Suits against the
state itself are extremely limited-mostly to countries on a U.S. State
Department list of "terrorist" countries, or to crimes committed in
the United States. In one ATCA case, a suit against the Argentine
government for human rights violations against businessman Jose
Siderman settled for a considerable sum.23  The trial of two
Salvadoran generals residing in Miami for torture led to a jury verdict
of $54 million, of which a small percentage may actually be paid to
the three victims.24 A class action suit on behalf of some 10,000
victims against ex-Philippine dictator Ferdinand Marcos led to a jury
verdict of $1.2 billion in exemplary damages and $766 million in
compensatory damages, calculated according to a complex formula.
However, the Philippine government advanced claims to the same
assets that would have been used to satisfy the judgment in part, and
in 2003 the parties were still fighting over distribution of Marcos'
assets .25
Such large judgments, even if mostly uncollectible, serve other
purposes. They allow victims to publicly tell their stories, publicize
22. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2003). The law was amended in 1991 to add the Torture
Victims Protection Act, which provides a specified cause of action in the federal
courts for torture and summary execution, and allows U.S. citizens as well as non-
citizens to sue.
23. Siderman de Blake v. Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 702 (9th Cir. 1992). After the
court allowed the case to proceed, the parties settled for an undisclosed sum.
24. The final judgment in the case of Romagoza Arce v. Garcia is available at
<www.cja.org/cases/Romagoza-Docs/RomagozaFinalJudgment.htm> (visited Jan. 6,
2004).
25. The parties came close to settlement in 1999. For a description of the
settlement, see Kohn, Swift & Graf, P.C., Marcos Litigation Settled for $150 Million
(Feb. 24, 1999), at <www.kohnswift.com/marcoset10299.htm>. Apparently, however,
litigation continues as of September 2003 over disposition of the assets and payout to
the victims. See She Caguimbal-Torres & Benjamin B. Pulta, RP Bucks Hawaii
Court Order on Marcos Assets (Sept. 6, 2003), at <www.sunstar.com.phstatic/net/
2003/09/06/rp.bucks. hawaii.court.order.on.marcos.assets.html>.
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the violations at issue and constitute an official recognition that the
plaintiffs were wronged; like parallel transnational criminal cases,
they may also keep defendants from traveling or from assuming high-
ranking government positions. And, like other transnational cases,
they may trigger or catalyze domestic efforts at obtaining redress.
Class action lawsuits in U.S. courts were important in prompting
administrative settlements of some Holocaust-related claims. Claims
against German and Austrian companies for use of slave labor and
against Swiss banks for misappropriating the assets of deceased
Jewish depositors raised the political profile of the issue and (together
with pressure from pension funds and other corporate stakeholders)
eventually led to diplomatic negotiations and settlements.
No other country has a direct analogue to the ATCA, although a
bill has been proposed in the United Kingdom, and civil law countries
have the partie civil procedure.26 Victim-initiated civil redress also
comes about through application (brought directly in the European
Court of Human Rights, and brought indirectly through the Inter-
American and African Commissions on Human Rights) to regional
human rights courts with the power to award damages payable by the
state. Reparations in the Inter-American and European Courts of
Human Rights are claimed against the state, for a violation of the
state's responsibility to protect and ensure rights. These courts have
awarded compensation' for violations including torture, summary
execution, disappearance and arbitrary detention. In the European
setting, with the exception of Turkey and, earlier, U.K. actions in
Northern Ireland, these cases have not tended to involve situations of
mass repression or civil conflict; in the Inter-American cases, they
often have.2 7  In addition, "friendly settlements" at the Inter-
American Commission have often involved negotiated settlements
with governments that result in substantial compensation for
individual victims.
The regional courts have the power to award not just
compensation, but other kinds of redress. For example, the Inter-
26. For a comparison of the ATCA/TVPA and the partie civile, see Beth
Stephens, Translating Fildrtiga: A Comparative and International Law Analysis of
Domestic Remedies For International Human Rights Violations, 27 YALE J. INT'L L. 1
(2002). The continued viability of the ATCA is now before the U.S. Supreme Court.
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 331 F.3d 604 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc), cert. granted, 72
U.S.L.W. 3171 (U.S. Dec. 1, 2003) (No. 03-339).
27. These cases are analyzed in detail in DINAH SHELTON, REMEDIES IN
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 24-25, 207-08, 221-23 (1999).
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American Court, if it finds a violation has occurred, can rule:
[Tihat the injured party be ensured the enjoyment of his right or
freedom that was... violated[,] ... that the consequences of the
measure or situation that constituted the breach of such right or
freedom be remedied and that fair compensation be paid to the.
injured party.28
In practice, the Inter-American Court has sometimes required states
to take specific actions like dredging up missing bodies or reinstating
plaintiffs to their jobs, and more often has ordered the state to
investigate violations and prosecute those found to be responsible.
But most of the relief provided has come as monetary compensation.
Damages have been awarded for lost earnings, for medical and other
expenses, and for the loss of life's project, by which the court means
the limitations and changes in life plans and prospects brought about
by the violator's actions. Punitive damages are generally not allowed.
Reparations may also be claimed against certain individual
perpetrators through the new International Criminal Court. The
International Criminal Tribunals of the former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda had very limited provisions for individual reparations.
Lobbying by women's groups and groups representing victims during
the Rome Conference in 1998 led to vastly expanded capacity of the
ICC judges to award reparations. Article 75 of the Rome Statute tells
the Court to craft rules on reparations for victims. The Court can,
upon request or on its own motion, decide on the amount of damages
and the form of reparations. According to the Rules of Procedure
(Rule 94) victims are to file written requests for reparations with the
registrar, including a description of the injury and, if possible, those
believed responsible. Victims may claim restitution of property or
other tangible items, compensation and "rehabilitation and other
forms of remedy." Reparations are to be paid by individual
perpetrators, not by states. There was some effort at Rome to include
provisions requiring states to pay where the harm resulted from state
policy, but states were not supportive. The Rome Statute also creates
a trust fund for victims, to be funded by confiscated assets of
perpetrators and voluntary contributions, which can be used to
distribute awards where there are a large number of victims or the
perpetrators' assets do not suffice. In April 2003, a five-member
board of directors began work defining criteria and procedures for
the fund's operation.
28. American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 8, art. 63-1.
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These court-based mechanisms work best when there are
individual violations or, at most, small numbers of victims. In
situations where large numbers of people were affected but only a
few sue, there is a perceived inequity when a few victims receive large
amounts of compensation while others, similarly situated, receive
nothing because they never filed claims or their cases were not heard.
The more thorough the destruction of a group or community, the
fewer survivors are available to file claims. Better educated, middle
class victims will access court systems far better than illiterate
farmers. It takes a long time for cases to meander through any legal
system. Court procedure is often obscure or, worse, seems to favor
defendants. There are serious limitations to how much can actually
be collected of a large judgment, especially against an individual
defendant.
Moreover, individual reparations fail to capture the collective
element of the harm in situations of mass conflict or repression. In
counter-insurgencies and civil conflicts, a major aim of the organizers
of atrocities is the destruction of community ties and the community
fabric, to preclude the community's support for rebels, to disperse any
organized opposition or to force the population to flee. In rural
societies and poor urban neighborhoods, the attempt is not simply to
kill, but to isolate, terrorize, sow distrust. Military forces may seek to
make local civilians complicit in atrocities, forcing them to watch or
even to participate in the violations of their neighbors' basic human
rights. In Guatemala, villages were forced to gather under army
supervision, and each villager was obliged to stab a bound victim
accused of subversion. In Rwanda and Sierra Leone, parents were
forced to kill their children, children their parents and neighbors.
These harms to community life and trust cannot easily be redressed
through individual awards. For all these reasons, access to courts,
national or regional, will be insufficient in cases of mass atrocity or
civil conflict.
B. Administrative Reparations Schemes
As part of a package of transitional measures, a few governments
have instituted administrative schemes to pay reparations to victims
and survivors of massive human rights violations. Truth commissions
have often recommended such schemes, but governments have been
slow to take them up. In general, existing reparations programs have
involved relatively well-off countries, or those where there is a limited
and easily identifiable set of victims. They have also involved
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violations committed by state security forces against a largely
unarmed opposition, as in the southern cone of South America or
Eastern Europe, and not in the context of a civil conflict that pitted
neighbors against each other.
1. The German Model
German reparations to the victims of the Holocaust served as the
model for subsequent administrative reparations programs. The
German state paid both individual and collective reparations. Those
claimants who could prove they had survived a concentration camp
received a lump-sum for deprivation of liberty, while another lump-
sum went to a coordinating body of Jewish organizations for the
settlement of Jewish victims living outside Israel.29 The German
Federal Law on Reparation provided damages for those who suffered
because of politics, race or religion. Compensable categories of harm
included loss of life, damage to health and loss of liberty. Loss of
liberty included detention in a camp or ghetto and forced labor.
Damages also covered damage to professional and economic
prospects as well as restitution of, or compensation for, property. The
jobs and pensions of former members of the civil service who were
dismissed because of Nazi persecution were reinstated. Collective
reparations were channeled to the nascent State of Israel. Despite
the billion-dollar sums involved, many victims remained unsatisfied
with the German effort. The administrative procedure was
intimidating and degrading, officials tried to weed out claims rather
than support victims, and professionals were treated far better than
ordinary workers."
2. South America
In the wake of military dictatorships during the 1970s and 1980s
in Chile, Argentina and Brazil, the newly-elected civilian
governments of those countries agreed to institute reparations
programs for victims of the human rights violations of their prior
dictatorial regimes. The scale of the programs, like the scale of the
repression, differed greatly from one country to the next. In Brazil,
where the smallest number of victims existed, a 1996 law provides
29. Kurt Schwerin, German Compensation for Victims of Nazi Persecution, 67
Nw. U. L. REV. 479, 493-94 (1972); SHELTON, supra note 27, at 334-36.
30. See, e.g., CHRISTIAN PROSS, PAYING FOR THE PAST: THE STRUGGLE OVER
REPARATIONS FOR SURVIVING VICTIMS OF THE NAZI TERROR (1998).
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compensation to family members of 136 people who disappeared at
the hands of the military. It also sets up a commission to process
ongoing claims.
In Chile, some three thousand people were killed by the security
forces in the months and years following the 1973 coup, and over a
thousand disappeared. When civilian Patricio Aylwin became
president in 1990, he appointed a Truth and Reconciliation
Commission to investigate the violations and recommend appropriate
reforms and reparations.3 ' The commission recommended, among
other things, the creation of a government entity to oversee
reparations to victims' families. In 1992, the Congress created the
Corporation for Reparation and Reconciliation to provide
compensation and rehabilitation to victims' families, and specified a
program that included a lump-sum payment equal to a year's pension
and a monthly pension, based on the average wage, for spouses,
parents and children of those killed or disappeared. Anyone whose
name appeared in the commission's report, or who was later added by
the corporation, was considered a "victim," and no additional proof
was required. Scholarships provided for the children of those killed
or disappeared allowed for secondary or university study until the
child turned thirty-five; some eight hundred children make use of the
subsidy, which includes tuition and a living allowance. Free medical
and psychological care, through the Ministry of Health's "Program of
Reparation and Integral Health Care," was available to a broader
group of victims' relatives and to survivors of the violations.
Argentina's military government disappeared well over ten
thousand people and killed and tortured thousands more. The
subsequent civilian regime appointed an independent commission to
investigate the disappearances; the commission's report, "Nunca Mds
(Never Again)," was a best-seller. The government then passed a
series of reparations measures of ever-increasing scope. The first
decree, 70/91, (later slightly broadened by Law 24.043) provided for
compensation for imprisonment for officially-recognized political
prisoners whose suits for compensation had been closed by the courts
on statute of limitations grounds. There were few of these, as most
prisoners had been unrecognized.
A second set of reparations laws passed in 1994. These laws
31. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION, REPORT OF THE
CHILEAN NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION (Phillip E.
Berryman trans., 1993).
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created the legal status of "absent due to forced disappearance,"
which allowed the families of the disappeared to remarry or claim
inheritance rights without having to concede that the disappeared
person was dead. The law thus created official acknowledgement of
the disappearance, which for the victims-was as important as its
practical effects. At the same time, Law 24.411 provided a lump-sum
compensation of $224,000 for the families of the disappeared and
those killed by the security forces. As in Chile, inclusion in the
commission's report was enough to establish eligibility of family
members.
The Argentine law extended to survivors of the detention camps
as well, and later informally extended to those who had been officially
exiled or unofficially detained. For detainees, the sum varied
depending on the number of days in detention. In both cases, the
money was paid by long-term bonds, which could either be held until
their date of maturity or sold, at a discount, on a secondary market.
In practice, many family members received far less than the face
value of the bonds. Finally, in 1999, the Argentine Congress created
a special fund to facilitate the identification and reunification with
their families of children kidnapped or born while their mothers were
captive during the years of dictatorship 2
In addition, both Chile and Argentina have provided some
degree of moral reparations. In both countries, reports detailed the
suffering of the victims and individualized what was known (often not
much) about their fate. In Chile, a copy of the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission's report was sent to the family of each
person killed or disappeared, and the president apologized in the
name of the state. In Argentina, the head of the army, General
Martin Balza, recognized that the military's tactics were wrong. In
Chile, a park and a memorial in Santiago's General Cemetery
commemorate the victims. In Argentina, commemoration has been
much more controversial. The Buenos Aires city government has
built a memorial, but the central government has not. Attempts in
both countries to raze torture sites have met with calls to turn them
instead into museums teaching about the past to avoid its repetition.
3. Eastern Europe
A number of Eastern European countries established
32. MARCELO A. SANCINETTI & MARCELO FERRANTE, EL DERECHO PENAL EN
LA PROTECCION DE LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS 360-77 (Jos6 Luis Depalma ed., 1999).
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compensation for those killed or imprisoned under communist
regimes. Czechoslovakia provided lost wages and costs to ex-political
prisoners who applied for, and received, a certificate of rehabilitation
from the courts.33 In Hungary, the post-Communist government set
up an elaborate system to compensate those unlawfully deprived of
their lives or liberty from 1939 to 1989."4 A lump-sum amounting to
some $10,000 was available for loss of life, to be divided among the
surviving spouse and the children or parents of the deceased. Lump-
sum compensation for imprisonment, forced labor or forced
resettlement was awarded according to a formula that included the
duration of the deprivation and the petitioner's life expectancy. In
Albania, a Law on Former Victims of Persecution awards both a
lump-sum and a pension to victims of political persecution and their
families.35
4. South Africa
South Africa also created the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission (TRC) to investigate gross human rights violations
during the years of apartheid rule. Unlike other "truth commissions,"
the TRC could not only hold hearings and publish a report with
recommendations, it could grant amnesty from criminal prosecution
and civil suit to individuals who came forward and admitted their
participation in political crimes. Indeed, a court challenge to the
constitutionality of the amnesty law turned in part on the court's view
that a government reparations program was a suitable substitute for
civil claims, given the large number of victims and the state's limited
resources.6 The Commission was divided into three committees, one
of which focused on reparations and rehabilitation. Unlike the other
two committees, however, the reparations and rehabilitation
committee had no independent budget (except for a small amount
used for emergency reparations like medical attention for those who
33. Kathleen E. Smith, Decommunization After the "Velvet Revolutions" in East
Central Europe, in IMPUNITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
PRACTICE 82, 91 (Naomi Roht-Arriaza ed., 1995).
34. Act XXXII of 1992 On the Compensation to Persons Unlawfully Deprived of
their Lives or Liberty for Political Reasons (enacted May 12, 1992) is discussed in
SHELTON, supra note 27, at 348 n.131.
35. Law No. 7748 of July 29, 1993, art. 7 (Alb.), reprinted in TRANSITIONAL
JUSTICE: How EMERGING DEMOCRACIES RECKON WITH FORMER REGIMES 661, 663
(Neil J. Kritz ed., 1995).
36. Azanian Peoples Organisation (AZAPO) v. President of the Republic of
South Africa, 1996 (8) BCLR 1015 (CC).
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testified at Commission hearings). Rather, the TRC committee was
to recommend a reparations program to the government, to be
implemented via legislation. To date, although the TRC published its
recommendations in 1998, reparations payments, with the exception
of payment of some 50 million rand (about $7.6 million) to eighteen
thousand people as immediate interim reparations, have not been
forthcoming.
The TRC ultimately recommended individual reparation grants
of about $3,500 per year for six years to victims, an amount it
considered "sufficient to make a meaningful impact on the quality of
the victims' lives. 3 7 It opted for not trying to individualize the
amounts based on length of detention or type of violation, finding
that it was impossible to rate degrees of suffering. In addition, it
recommended provision of medical and psychological care,
fulfillment of significant personal and community needs (like
headstones for graves) and symbolic reparations. These were to
include the renaming of streets, the construction of memorials and
monuments and the creation of culturally appropriate ceremonies.
The proposed collective reparations included health care programs
specifically tailored to different groups, mental health care facilities,
educational and vocational training programs and housing
development projects. Finally, the TRC report itself, and the public
hearings held pursuant to its mandate, can be seen as forms of moral
reparations. Government reaction to the report was slow; only in
2003 did President Mbeki propose a one-time grant of around $3,500
to each victim. Victims' groups reacted with anger and
disappointment.
5. Central America
The Truth Commissions in El Salvador and Guatemala also
recommended a range of reparatory measures, few of which have
been carried out. The Salvadoran Truth Commission, made up
entirely of non-Salvadorans, recommended a range of disciplinary
actions to "cleanse" the military, public administration and judiciary,
among other reforms. It called for the creation of a special fund,
financed by government and international aid funds, to pay
compensation to victims. It also recommended moral reparations, in
37. Truth and Reconciliation Commission, A Summary of Reparation and
Rehabilitation Policy, Including Proposals to be Considered by the President, at
<www.doj.gov.za/trc/reparations/summary.htm> (visited Nov. 14, 2003).
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the form of a monument, a day of remembrance and a follow-up body
to monitor compliance with the recommendations. Neither of the
parties to the conflict, now represented in the government and the
opposition, expressed interest in carrying out these recommendations,
and survivors have expressed a sense of abandonment as a result."
In Guatemala, the U.N.-backed Commission for Historical
Clarification (CHC) as well as a church-backed commission (REMHI)
produced detailed reports of the violations, including what the CHC
called "acts of genocide" against the native Mayan people. Both
reports recommended reparations programs. The CHC called for
official acknowledgement, construction of parks and monuments,
giving the names of victims to public buildings, a day of remembrance
and rescue of Mayan sacred sites. It also recommended a National
Reparation Program, to include restitution of material possessions,
especially land, compensation for the "most serious injuries and
losses," psychosocial rehabilitation and moral and symbolic
reparations, with details to be worked out in conjunction with civil
society, especially the Mayan population. It recommended that
individual reparations be prioritized, taking into consideration the
severity of the violation, the economic situation and social
vulnerability of the individual, and paying particular attention to the
elderly, widows, minors or other disadvantaged categories. To date,
both the government and the guerrilla movement have acknowledged
their role in the violations and made a public apology, but the rest of
the reparations agenda is stalled.
6. Trust Funds
A few states, and the United Nations, have created trust funds
aimed at helping victims of violations, but all suffer from severe
underfunding. In the wake of Sierra Leone's civil war, for example,
the government set up a Special Fund for War Victims, hoping to
channel foreign funds into rehabilitation projects. The United
Nations Voluntary Fund for Victims of Torture, one of the largest
U.N. humanitarian aid funds, has a 2003 budget of thirteen million
38. VIcTOR ESPINOZA CUEVAS ET AL., CORPORACION DE PROMOCION Y DEFENSA
DE LOS DERECHOS DEL PUEBLO (CODEPU-CHILE) & ASOCIAC16N PARA LA
PREVENCION DE LA TORTURA (APT-SUIZA), COMISIONES DE VERDAD LUN
CAMINO INCIERTO?: ESTUDIO COMPARATIVO DE COMISIONES DE LA VERDAD EN
ARGENTINA, CHILE, EL SALVADOR, GUATEMALA Y SUDAFRICA DESDE LAS VICTIMAS
Y LAS ORGANIZACIONES DE DERECHOS HUMANOS 139, available at
<www.apt.ch/pub/library/Estudio2.pdf> (visited Jan. 21,2004).
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dollars, contributed largely by member states. Some developed-
country governments, including the United States, have their own
funds for victims of atrocities abroad.
7. Land and Property Restitution
National courts have been active in the wake of civil conflict or
repression in the area of restitution of land and property. In Bosnia-
Herzegovina, a special Commission on Real Property Claims looked
into restitution and compensation for land and property lost during
the 1992-1995 war. The Dayton Peace Agreement included
provisions de-legalizing transfers of property made under threat or
duress or otherwise connected to ethnic cleansing, and providing for
restitution of such property after the commission has received proof,
before a given deadline, of lawful ownership. Proof may come from
the 1991 municipal property books, from tax records or inheritance
documents. The Commission may also, in theory, provide monetary
compensation for property when individuals chose not to return to
their pre-war residence (because they would be in the minority or for
security reasons), but in practice little money for compensation has
been available.39 Other post-Communist Eastern European countries
also provided restitution for loss of property.
In South Africa, land claims courts have been set up to consider
the claims of African communities dispossessed by apartheid rules.
Under the South African Restitution Act, plaintiffs must show that
they are communities or individuals who themselves or through their
forebear had rights in land of which they were dispossessed after June
19, 1913, by racially discriminatory laws or practices. The difficulties
of proving rights in land going back generations, where land was often
held communally and without written title, are formidable, and the
land claims courts have used testimony from historians and
anthropologists as well as local elders to substantiate claims. The
claims courts attempt to reach a mediated settlement, but if they
cannot a formal hearing ensues. Remedies can include full
ownership, partial rights to the land, rights to equivalent land or
compensation. The present landowners are compensated by the state
39. Dayton Peace Agreement, Dec. 14, 1995, Annex 7, art. 1, 35 I.L.M. 75 (1996),
available at <www.crpc.org.ba/new/en/html/laws/DPA/annex7.htm> (visited Nov. 14,
2003). See generally Lynn Hastings, Implementation of the Property Legislation in
Bosnia Herzegovina, 37 STAN. J. INT'L. L. 221 (2001). I would like to thank Cortney
Dell for research assistance on this and the next footnote through a seminar paper.
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at market value.4
8. Iraq
Finally, a U.N. Compensation Commission was set up in the
wake of Iraq's 1990 invasion of Kuwait to provide compensation to
foreign governments, corporations and individuals injured by Iraq's
actions. The compensation was provided by the sale of a fixed
percentage of Iraqi oil. The U.N. Security Council administers the
fund through a Governing Council of its members, assisted by a
number of expert Commissioners. A broad set of claims categories
was allowed. Category A claims involve individuals forced to leave
Kuwait or Iraq as a result of the invasion. These individuals received
a lump-sum of $2,500 ($5,000 per family) with the possibility of higher
awards in certain cases. Category B claims for serious personal injury
or death are paid according to a schedule depending on the type and
gravity of the violation. A small lump-sum (up to $10,000 per family)
can be obtained with little delay or process, and higher amounts may
be claimed with appropriate evidence. C and D claims are for larger
amounts, including for property losses; E claims are corporate claims;
and F claims are for governments and international organizations. A
and B claims are to be paid first.'
C. Weaknesses of Compensation Schemes
These compensation schemes share a number of vexing
problems. First, and perhaps most difficult, is the definition of who is
a "victim." Governments have generally balanced the limited funds
available against the needs and demands of affected individuals and
families. The result has often not been very satisfying. For example,
in Chile the government decided to focus solely on those killed and
40. South Africa Restitution Act, amended by Land Restitution and Reform
Laws Amendment Act 63 of 1997, available at <www.lawsoc.co.za/members/legal
resources/usefulleg/landrestandreformlawsaamdact.htm> (visited Jan. 18, 2004).
41. S.C. Res. 705, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/705 (1991)
(concerning compensation in Iraq); Decision taken by the Governing Council of the
United Nations Compensation Commission during its second session, at its 15th
Meeting, held on 18 October 1991: Personal Injury and Mental Anguish, Governing
Council of the U.N. Compensation Commission, 2d Sess., 15th mtg. at 1-3, U.N. Doc.
S/AC.26/199113 (1991); see generally, e.g., David J. Bederman, The United Nations
Compensation Commission and the Tradition of International Claims Settlement, 27
N.Y.U. J. INT'L. L. & POL. 1 (1994); SHELTON, supra note 27, at 337-45. On May 22,
2003, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1483 (2003), reducing the percentage
of oil sales to be paid into the Compensation Fund.
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disappeared by the security forces, leaving aside the vastly larger
number of those who were tortured while in detention and survived,
and those who were forced into exile. While justified as a way to
spend limited funds on the "worst" violations, the effect was to
infuriate survivors, who read this as a lack of recognition for the
severity of their own suffering and an attempt to paper over the
extent of the crimes. 2
In South Africa, a similar restriction of the category of "victim"
to those who suffered from the gross violations prohibited under
South African as well as international law-killing, torture,
abduction-produced similar critiques. Critics of the TRC pointed
out that this limited mandate excluded the legal pillars of apartheid:
forced removals, pass laws, residential segregation and other forms of
racial discrimination and detention without trial.43 By doing so, it
shifted the focus from the complicity and benefits of apartheid to
whites as a group to the misdeeds of a smaller group of security force
operatives, easily characterized as "bad apples." Again, the definition
of "victim" acts to frame the discussion, sometimes in undesirable
ways.
Other examples of the ambiguities in defining "victims" come
from Central America. In Guatemala, at the height of the army's
counterinsurgency drive in the early 1980s, it recruited hundreds of
thousands of mostly Mayan peasants to serve in paramilitary Patrullas
de Auto-defensa Civil (Civil Self-Defense Patrols or PACs). Some
people joined voluntarily, while others were coerced. Service was
uncompensated, and PAC members were used both as human shields
and to carry out the army's dirty work of murder, rape and
destruction.' In 2002, hundreds of PAC leaders demanded
reparations from the government for what they claimed was
uncompensated government service. Unlike the thousands of victims
of army and paramilitary rights violations, these PAC members were
armed and vocal, and the government quickly agreed to issue bonds
42. CUEVAS ET AL., supra note 38.
43. Richard A. Wilson, Justice and Legitimacy in the South African Transition, in
THE POLITICS OF MEMORY 207 (Alexandra Barahona de Brito, et al. eds., 2001);
Mahmood Mamdani, Reconciliation Without Justice, in 46 SOUTHERN AFRICAN
REVIEW OF BOOKS (1996) (book review), available at <www.uni-ulm.de/
-rturrell/antho3html/Mamdani.html>.
44. SUSANNE JONAS, THE BATTLE FOR GUATEMALA 150-51 (1991); Shelton H.
Davis, Introduction: Sowing the Seeds of Violence, in HARVEST OF VIOLENCE 27-30
(Robert M. Carmack ed., 1988).
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to compensate them some Q5000 (about $675), payable in three
installments over two years. (Of course, it was also an election year,
as human rights groups bitterly pointed out.) Meanwhile, in
Nicaragua, veterans of the U.S.-backed "contra" forces who waged
war against the leftist Sandinista government in the 1980s are
reportedly seeking benefits and compensation from the U.S.
government for their services." These cases raise interesting
questions about who uses the discourse of reparations, and for what
ends. It also points up what seems to be a common complaint in the
wake of civil conflicts: while reparations for victims languish, '
resettlement and reintegration of ex-combatants is a priority of those
funding and organizing civil reconstruction. There may be good
reasons for this, including avoiding new conflicts and trying to tamp
down the inevitable growth in criminality, but it also rankles with
victims' groups who often see their material circumstances deteriorate
as the perpetrators' improve.
Many of the problems involved in designing and implementing
administrative schemes are common to other kinds of mass harm.
They concern the mechanisms involved, and the degree of
individualized evidence of damages. The mechanisms of sampling,
prioritization of claims, schedules of damages for different types of
harm and the like can be borrowed from mass tort actions. A more
fundamental problem has been the degree to which claims are
individualized: the more individualization, the more delay, the more
evidence required and the longer the process will take. The risk of
retraumatization of victims forced to justify their "victimhood" in
claims proceedings before uncaring or even hostile bureaucrats and
courts in order to obtain benefits is borne out by studies of Holocaust
victims and others. 7 Moreover, individuation of claims may favor the
45. Consuelo Sandoval, Contras demandardn a EE. UU. en calidad de veteranos
de guerra, LA PRENSA (Nicaragua), Oct. 3, 2003, available at <www-ni.laprensa.
com.ni/archivo/2003/octubre/03/politica/politica-20031003-06.html>.
46. See, e.g., Marieke Wierda, Justice for Victims in Sierra Leone, in THE
REDRESS TRUST, THE REPARATION REPORT 6 (Mar. 1, 2003), at
<www.redress.org/publications[Redress0l.pdf> (discussing complaints of an
association representing amputees in Sierra Leone that more funds have been spent
on resettlement of ex-combatants-many of whom are perpetrators of awful
crimes-than on victims).
47. THE REDRESS TRUST, TORTURE SURVIVORS' PERCEPTIONS OF REPARATION:
PRELIMINARY SURVEY 55 (2001), at <www.redress.org/publications/TSPR.pdf>; Ellen
L. Lutz, After the Elections: Compensating Victims of Human Rights Abuses, in NEW
DIRECTIONS IN HUMAN RIGHTS 210 (Ellen L. Lutz et al. eds., 1989). See, e.g., David
W. Chen, Relatives' Lawyers Ask Court to Rule Sept. 11 Fund Unfair, N.Y. TIMES,
20041
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
wealthy and professionals to the detriment of less well-off victims,
creating resentments both within the victim class and more
generally.48 The South African solution, to refuse to individualize
claims at all, substitutes for these problems the inability to recognize
that some people suffered, and continue to suffer, more than others,
and should be compensated accordingly. Some schemes attempt a
compromise, through the erection of broad categories of harm that
are compensated at a given rate.
The largest comparative study to interview victims to ascertain
their needs was carried out by the Chilean human rights organization
CODEPU under the auspices of the Association for the Prevention of
Torture 9.4 The study interviewed about one hundred individuals and
groups of family members of disappeared and summarily executed
victims in Chile, Argentina, El Salvador, Guatemala and (relying on
secondary research) South Africa. The results of the CODEPU study
emphasized that for the victims, moral and legal measures of
reparation are fundamental, while monetary compensation is
controversial and problematic. Over and over again, in interviews
and in interactions with therapists, victims ask for official and societal
acknowledgment that they were wronged, restoration of their good
name, knowledge of who and how it was done, justice and moral
reparations. Victims are much more ambivalent about monetary
reparations. On the one hand, a number of victims and organizations
of family members refused all money as "blood money" intended to
silence them and to deflect attention from the larger issues of
impunity and societal recognition. On the other, some victims saw
material reparations as just recognition by the state of the harm
caused, money that would otherwise go to the state. All agreed that
compensation was never enough, or even the most important thing.
They especially noted the hollowness of material reparations when
there has been a pronounced reluctance to prosecute those
responsible.
One striking finding of the CODEPU study is the emphasis
survivors placed on education for the children of those killed,
disappeared, tortured or imprisoned. The one positive aspect of
Chile's reparations program consistently mentioned was the provision
of scholarships and money for educational expenses. In South Africa
Apr. 15, 2003, at D3.
48. PROSS, supra note 30, at 176.
49. CUEVAS ET AL., supra note 38.
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as well, victims wanted the perpetrators to pay by having to support
the victims' children through school. While it is unclear to what
extent these responses are culturally specific or otherwise limited, one
explanation might be that even victims who do not expect
compensation to make much of a difference in their own damaged
lives want resources that could improve the lives of their children.
Victims, in other words, tend to be more positive about forward-
looking measures that improve the chances of future generations.
IV. Collective Reparations in the Wake of Massive Conflicts
It is not coincidental that governmental reparations programs
have involved mostly situations with limited numbers of victims and
claims. Argentina, even with its ten to thirty thousand disappeared,
pales in comparison with the two hundred thousand dead or
disappeared of Guatemala or Bosnia, or the eight hundred thousand
dead in Rwanda. These situations involving tens or even hundreds of
thousands of victims generally occur in poor countries with too few
resources and many pressing needs. Often-but not always-a large
number of victims coincides with a civil conflict that devastated the
country's infrastructure and involved large segments of the
population, who now need to learn to share their country in some
way. In these situations, individualized monetary reparations are
difficult to imagine, absent a substantial financial commitment from
the international community that has not been forthcoming to date.
What then? For those who believe some form of reparation is
both a right of the victims and a necessity for social reconstruction,
the answer has generally been to look for some form of collective
reparations.
Because the number of victims is so large, situations of
widespread conflict and genocide exacerbate the limitations of
individual reparations schemes. Reparations, whether through courts
or administrative compensation schemes, are designed to be
implemented by a generally functional system, not one suffering
massive breakdowns in every facet of life and governance. Moreover,
in massive conflicts the collective nature of the harm becomes more
important. Individual reparations deal inadequately with structural
discrimination and oppression of a group. Where there is attempted
genocide, the harm is defined in terms of an attempt to destroy a
group, so that reparation should be similarly defined. The
displacement and destruction of whole communities, the setting of
neighbor against neighbor, the breeding of forced complicity and of
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atomization and distrust, are all hallmarks of genocidal or large-scale
political conflicts. Moreover, in such situations the lines between
victim, bystander, accomplice, and perpetrator are blurred.
Testimony from Bosnia, Rwanda, Guatemala and elsewhere is replete
with instances where killers hid potential victims in their house, or
were forced under varying degrees of duress to commit horrid crimes.
Individual reparations in these cases become harder to define and to
manage.
A. Courts and Collective Reparations
Court-based mechanisms tend to function most effectively for
individual litigants or small groups. Nevertheless, the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights (IACHR or Court) has taken some steps in
the direction of using the court system to award collective
reparations. In the Aloeboetoe case, the Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights (the Commission) alleged that on December 31,
1987, soldiers from the Government of Suriname ambushed and
attacked more than twenty male, unarmed Bushnegroes (Maroons),
suspecting that they were members of the Jungle Commando. While
most were allowed to continue on their way, the soldiers detained
seven of the men, dragging them, blindfolding them and eventually
executing six of them. In its initial judgment on the matter, handed
down on December 4, 1991, the IACHR noted the Republic of
Suriname's admission of responsibility and decided to retain the case
on its docket for a further hearing on reparations and costs.
In the separate hearing on reparations, the Commission argued
that because of the nature of the familial and community social
structure of the Saramaka tribe, to which the Maroons belonged, and
because the executions of the Maroon men was emblematic of
ongoing conflicts between the community and the government, the
Maroon community demanded certain collective reparations above
and beyond the reparations granted to the victims' families.
According to the Commission: "The deeds for which the Government
accepted responsibility appear to have caused damages to the
Saramaka tribe, aggravated by the Government's subsequent actions
of not recognizing 'the rights of the Bushnegroes. "50 The Commission
then provided examples of such reparations: a public apology from
50. Aloeboetoe et al. Case, Reparations (Art. 63(1) American Convention on
Human Rights), Judgment of September 10, 1993, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 15,
19 (1993).
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the president of Suriname, an apology from the congress of Suriname
to the chiefs of the tribe and the naming of a public park, street or
square after the tribe, among others. Moreover, the Commission
requested that the Court grant two million Surinamese guilders to the
tribe for moral damages suffered by the tribe.
In Section XIII of its judgment, the Court grappled with the issue
of collective moral reparations. The Court first discussed and
ultimately denied the prayer for monetary compensation:
As for the argument linking the claim for moral damages to the
unique social structure of the Saramakas who were generally
harmed by the killings, the Court believes that all persons, in
addition to being members of their own families and citizens of a
State, also generally belong to intermediate communities. In
practice, the obligation to pay moral compensation does not extend
to such communities, nor to the State in which the victim
participated; these are redressed by the enforcement of the system
of laws. If in some exceptional case such compensation has been
granted, it would have been to a community that suffered direct
damage.51
However, in the final statement of reparations, the Court:
[O]rders the State of Suriname, as an act of reparation, to reopen
the school house located in Gujaba and staff it with teaching and
administrative personnel so that it will function on a permanent
basis as of 1994, and to make the medical dispensar' already in
place in that locality operational during that same year.
The Court did not refer to the Commission's request for moral
collective reparations.
A second case in which the Inter-American human rights system
grappled with the prospect of collective reparations is Chanay Pablo
v. Guatemala, or more commonly referred to as the Colotenango case.
The violations upon which this case arose occurred on August 3, 1993,
in Colotenango, Huehuetenango, Guatemala. Members of local
communities met in Colotenango to stage a peaceful protest against
the abusive and illegal activities of the civil patrols in the area. At the
conclusion of the protest, members of the civil patrol positioned
themselves at both ends of a bridge, trapping numerous protestors
who were on their way home. The patrol members opened fire on the
group, killing Juan Chanay Pablo and injuring several others.
51. Id. 183.
52. Id. 95.
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Throughout the legal aftermath of this attack, civil patrol members
frequently intimidated and attacked the witnesses, the accusers and
an attorney participating in the case. Finally, the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights, asked the Court for provisional
measures to protect the witnesses and complainants, visited
Guatemala and investigated the situation. At that point the parties,
Guatemala and the Commission were able to reach a friendly
settlement. After a series of meetings, under the mediation of the
Commission, the negotiation process successfully concluded on
February 20, 1997. The parties agreed that the state would provide
Q300,000 (some $43,000) to financially compensate the individuals
directly affected by the Colotenango attack, and the government
agreed to ensure that justice was done. In addition, "the State of
Guatemala shall provide communal assistance to the affected
communities of Colotenango, in accordance with a program of
projects agreed upon by the parties.""
In Rwanda, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
(ICTR), through the Office of the Registrar, at one point attempted
to provide minimal support for witnesses coming before the tribunal,
who were often in desperate financial straits. On its own initiative, in
September 2000, the registrar's office launched an initiative to
provide legal advice, psychological counseling, physical therapy and
monetary assistance, and also contributed to a number of projects in
Taba township, the locality where the mayor was convicted of
genocide and where there were hundreds of survivors, most of them
destitute women. But the Tribunal soon found that the needs far
exceeded its capacity, that it was ill-equipped to design and
administer reparations schemes, and that to do so adequately would
require amendment of the Tribunal's statute and rules. The effort
was scaled back, although the judges and prosecutor agreed that the
U.N. Security Council should amend the ICTR's statute to allow it a
greater role in compensation. 4
B. Administrative Compensation Schemes and Collective
Reparations
As with individual reparations, the most comprehensive
53. Chanay Pablo v. Guatemala (Colotenango case), Case 11.212, Inter-Am
C.H.R., OEA/Ser.L/V/II.95, doc. 7 rev. 447 (1997).
54. U.N. Doc. S/2000/1198 (2000). The ICTY came to similar conclusions. See
U.N. Doc. S/2000/1063 (2000).
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collective reparations have been paid by Germany to Jewish
organizations and to the state of Israel as reparations for the
Holocaust. Collective reparations were necessary to compensate for
the property, lives and suffering of those with no living heirs or
dependants, for the loss of institutions and communities and for the
damage to the "very fabric of the Jewish people's existence."55 A
total of DM3.45 billion were eventually paid to Israel for acts against
the Jewish people, in addition to substantial amounts of
compensation to other European states and to individual victims and
survivors.
Outside the Holocaust context, collective claims have fared less
well. In the late 1980s, the Japanese "comfort women," for example,
after decades of silence, began to organize to seek redress for their
enslavement by the Japanese army. The women sought
acknowledgement, disclosure, an official apology, a memorial,
compensation for the survivors or their families and changes in the
teaching of history. In 1991, one woman, Kim Hak Sun, filed suit
against the Japanese government. Eventually, the government
appointed a committee to study the issue, the emperor expressed
"extreme sorrow" and other officials expressed remorse. While the
government refused to provide individual compensation, it did
attempt a form of collective reparations. An "Asian Womens' Fund"
is funded by donations from private individuals and organizations and
is used to improve the conditions of the women. The survivors have
criticized this approach as based on socio-economic need rather than
on moral restitution. They have held out for individual reparations
fully funded by the government and accompanied by a formal
apology from the Diet (Japanese Parliament). 6
V. Collective Reparations After Mass Atrocities: Developing the
Options
As we have seen, courts have struggled with the idea of collective
reparations. Yet individualized reparations in the wake of mass
conflict or genocide are both unlikely in poor states and inadequate
to meet the needs of post-conflict societies. In practice, a number of
55. SHELTON, supra note 27, at 334 (citing NANA SAGAI, GERMAN REPARATIONS:
A HISTORY OF THE NEGOTIATIONS (1980)).
56. Roy L. Brooks, What Form Redress, in WHEN SORRY ISN'T ENOUGH: THE
CONTROVERSY OVER APOLOGIES AND REPARATIONS FOR HUMAN INJUSTICE 89 (Roy
L. Brooks ed. 1999).
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more flexible approaches are emerging and should be encouraged.
These approaches fit into three broadly defined and overlapping
models: reparations as development, reparations as community-level
acknowledgement and atonement and reparations as preferential
access. I will explore the advantages and complications of each in
turn.
A. Reparations as Development
Most communities affected by genocide or massive conflict were
desperately poor before the conflict started-indeed, in many cases
poverty and inequality are key underlying causes of the violence.
Widespread destruction of property, crops, infrastructure and services
during conflict only make poverty worse. In addition, thousands of
widows and orphans are forced to fend for themselves, often in
situations where property and inheritance laws disfavor women.
Economic development is thus a sorely needed commodity, and it
may be most needed in the worst hit conflict zones.
Community-based development projects recognize the wrong
done to the community as a whole, and give community members a
concrete focus around which to begin rebuilding the fragile ties
among neighbors that were stretched or broken during the conflict.
Often people will have fled or been displaced during the conflict, and
post-conflict villages and neighborhoods will include a different mix
of people; the old ties will simply not exist. In this case as well, once
there is a minimal amount of stability of residence, community-based
projects can help integrate and further stabilize the area.
One key idea underlying community development as reparations
is that the community must have a voice in deciding its priorities and
in the design of development projects. Should the government build
a school, or a well, or a new market? The Guatemalan CHC
recommended that "[i]n the specific case of measures for collective
reparation it is essential that the beneficiaries themselves participate
in defining the priorities of the reparation process."57 The South
African TRC recommended community reparations along similar
lines:
Community Rehabilitation Programmes hinge on the main policy
57. Commission for Historical Clarification, American Association for the
Advancement of Science, Guatemala: Memory of Silence, Recommendations, 11,
at <http://shr.aaas.org/guatemala/ceh/report/english/recs3.html> (visited Jan. 17,
2004).
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principle that reparation should be development centred, to
empower individuals and communities to take control of their own
lives. It therefore implies the provision of sufficient knowledge and
information about available resources to victims through a
participatory process.. .providing individuals with resources to
access services is not enough as these services are in many cases
"unavailable, inaccessible or inappropriate." It also notes that
entire communities have been subjected to systematic abuse, and
may suffer from post-traumatic stress symptoms.... Among the
categories of community rehabilitation recommended are health
care, mental health care, education and housing. A programme to
demilitarize the youth who have come to accept violence as a way
18
of resolving conflict is included.
The most attractive feature of equating collective reparations
with local development is that it avoids the dilemma of choosing
between reparations and other, equally pressing, priorities. The
South African government has resisted paying individual reparations
by arguing that there are many victims of apartheid with equal, if not
more pressing, claims to the scarce funds available to the government.
The overall goal of fundamental social transformation is paramount,
the government insisted, and the TRC's reparations proposals could
only be accommodated within that larger goal. 9 If reparations are
integrated into a larger reconstruction and development agenda, the
two sets of needs converge.
A focus on reparations as development also allows the new
government to address some of the "backward-looking" problems of
distributive justice that fuel many conflicts. As Rama Mani writes:
"[Distributive justice] must seek to redress deep-rooted historical
injustices stemming from structural and systemic inequalities between
groups in the actual possession of, access to and opportunities for
economic and political power which, in some way, contributed to
conflict." 6 There is a close connection between reparative justice and
this kind of "backward-looking" redress of inequality, which gets at
58. Hlengiwe Mkhize, Introductory Notes to the Presentation of the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission's Proposed Reparation and Rehabilitation Policies, 23
Oct. 1997, in WHEN SORRY ISN'T ENOUGH: THE CONTROVERSY OVER APOLOGIES
AND REPARATIONS FOR HUMAN INUSTICE, supra note 56, at 501.
59. See, e.g., Matome Sebelebele, Mbeki Says No to 'Wealth Tax' (Apr. 15, 2003),
available at <www.safrica.info/essinfo/sa._glance/constitution/wealthtax.htm>.
60. RAMA MANI, BEYOND RETRIBUTION 179 (2002). Mani writes about three
interconnected spheres of justice: legal justice, reparative justice and distributive
justice. All three must be adequately addressed in post-conflict societies.
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the roots, not just the consequences, of conflict.
A "reparations as development" view also might facilitate
receiving redress from third-party states or private actors who fueled
the conflict, through money, guns, advisers or the like. The
Salvadoran Truth Commission alluded to this possibility when it
recommended that one percent of foreign aid to El Salvador be set
aside to pay reparations; however, the recommendation was shelved.
If the issue was framed as development rather than redress, funds
might be more forthcoming.
This view of reparations, has a number of drawbacks. The biggest
is that it conflates two separate obligations of government: to make
reparation for wrongs it committed, and to provide essential services
to the population. Why should government be able to do what it is
already obligated to do in its capacity as tax-receiver and public
works provider, slap a "reparations" label on it, and get off cheaply?
Human rights groups have objected to this conflation of obligations as
an abdication of the state's legal obligation to respond to past
injustices.
It is also practically impossible in many cases to appropriately
target development projects as reparations to the victims and
survivors. Where the country is ethnically or politically divided along
geographic lines, it may be possible to funnel development aid and
projects to the hardest-hit areas, where most victims and survivors
reside. But doing so may foster new resentments at perceived
favoritism, or even be seen as part of a nefarious counter-insurgency
or collective punishment strategy. The development of new
infrastructure and services may even tend to disproportionately favor
those with the economic and social power to take most advantage. In
countries like Rwanda, where Hutu and Tutsi live intertwined,
services and infrastructure cannot feasibly be reserved to the "victim"
group, and so development projects framed as reparation are of equal
benefit to victims, bystanders and even, at times, perpetrators. The
Guatemalan Truth Commission found this a necessary concession to
avoid stigmatization of these groups:
Collective reparatory measures should be implemented in such a
way as to facilitate reconciliation between victims and perpetrators,
without stigmatising either. Therefore, collective reparatory
measures for survivors of collective human rights violations and
acts of violence, and their relatives, should be carried out within a
framework of territorially based projects to promote reconciliation,
so that in addition to addressing reparation, their other actions and
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benefits also favour the entire population, without distinction
between victims and perpetrators.6
Most important, the "reparations as development" paradigm
negates or underrates the moral element of reparations that studies
have shown to be the most important. Reparation is secondarily
about compensation; its symbolic aspects are paramount. There is
nothing to stop government, of course, from adding a
commemorative element to its provision of basic services: naming the
school or the health center after victims of conflict or repression,
combining the road opening with a monument. But this has to be
consciously done, and the development project has to be framed not
just as development but as redress. In areas with overwhelming
needs, such projects, while no substitute for individualized
reparations, may be the best that may be expected.
One of the obstacles to pursuing a "reparations as development"
framework is the differing mandates, cultures and conceptualization
of goals between those focused on "transitional justice," including
reparations, and those in government and international development
agencies focused on post-conflict reconstruction and development.
The two visions have moved closer together in recent years, as the
U.N. Development Programme (UNDP) and the World Bank, as well
as major European, Canadian and U.S. development agencies, have
realized the need for a specific approach to their post-conflict
interventions. The major intergovernmental development agencies
now have post-conflict units. UNDP's Bureau for Crisis Prevention
and Recovery aims to "facilitate[] the transition from crisis to
sustainable development" in post-conflict societies. UNDP's list of
recovery priorities includes reintegration of refugees, the displaced
and former combatants and "reduction of conflict and promotion of
reconciliation through conflict-sensitive programming that assesses
tensions, divisions and conflict points within communities as an
integral part of preparing and designing programs."62
The World Bank created a Conflict Prevention and
Reconstruction Unit in July 1997. Part of the unit's work is to assure
that the Bank's development assistance minimizes potential causes of
conflict, but it also considers avoiding the resurgence of conflict.63 It
61. Commission for Historical Clarification, supra note 57, 10.
62. UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, List of Recovery Priorities, at
<www.undp.org/erd/recovery/recoverypriorities.htm> (visited Jan. 6, 2003).
63. WORLD BANK GROUP, OPERATIONAL POLICY 2.30: DEVELOPMENT
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developed a similar series of transitional "early reconstruction
activities," including "urgent repair of vital facilities such as schools,
health centers, sanitation infrastructure, and shelter, to benefit
returning refugees and displaced people, as well as affected
communities," demobilization, schemes to promote employment and
reintegration of populations displaced by the conflict.' The Bank has
also created a post-conflict Fund, which spent some $40 million from
1997 to 2001 on "restoration of the lives and livelihood of war-
affected populations" in thirty-two countries.65
National development agencies have moved in a similar
direction. The United States in 1994 created a special office within
the Agency for International Development, known as the Office for
Transition Initiatives (OTI). OTI defines its mission as "seizing
critical windows of opportunity, OTI works on the ground to provide
fast, flexible, short-term assistance targeted at key transition needs.
Its ability to assist local partners in addressing the root causes of
conflict is key to bridging the gap between emergency relief and long-
term sustainable development." 66 Its areas of work include building
citizen security (including community stabilizing, civilian-military
relationships, police reform, reintegrating ex-combatants and mine
awareness education) and promoting reconciliation (including conflict
management, domestic judicial/human rights processes and
international judicial/human rights processes). The Canadian
International Development Agency created a Peacebuilding Fund for
projects in the transitional justice area. The Norwegian government
funds transitional justice initiatives through the foreign ministry, the
Human Rights Fund and the Norwegian Resource Bank for
Democracy and Human Rights (NORDEM) for personnel needs.
COOPERATION AND CONFLICT, 2 (2001), available at
<http://wblnOO18.worldbank.org/InstitutionaUManuals/OpManual.nsf/OPolw/5870 6 98
DE018C520852569E5004EC9AD?OpenDocument>.
64. WORLD BANK, POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION: THE ROLE OF THE WORLD
BANK 45 (1998), available at <http://lnweb18.worldbank.org/essd/
sdvext.nsf/67ByDocName/FrameworkforWorldBanklnvolvementinPost-
ConflictReconstruction/$File/pcr-role-of-bank.pdf>.
65. POST-CONFLICT FUND, WORLD BANK GROUP, Executive Summary of
Evaluation of the Post-Conflict Fund, at para. v., available at
<http://wblnOO18.worldbank.org/Networks/ESSD/icdb.nsf/D4856F12E805DF485256
6C9007C27A6/78A3515FAAFB5AF285256C6F007EBB95/$FILE/IndependentEvalu
ationFinalDAI.pdf> (visited Jan. 6, 2003).
66. BUREAU FOR HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE, UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, Transition Initiatives, at <www.usaid.gov/pubs/
cbj2002/centprog/bhr/ti.html> (visited January 27, 2004).
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Other donor countries work through their development assistance
agency.
Integrating post-conflict reconstruction and collective
reparations seems, therefore, promising. Attempts to do so will,
however, encounter difficulties based on differences in vocabulary,
professional biases, restrictive mandates and ease of goals. Neither
UNDP nor the World Bank frames issues in terms of reparatory
justice, law or rights, but rather in terms of repair of the consequences
of conflict and economic growth. At most, there is a recognition that
past inequities fuel conflict, but no specific attention to the needs of
victims or hard-hit sectors or communities per se. There is overlap:
the World Bank already allows preferential attention to the needs of
war-affected groups who are especially vulnerable by reasons of
gender, age or disability.67 By targeting displaced persons, or women
and children, development agencies will at the same time target large
numbers of victims of human rights or humanitarian law violations-
they just aren't identified as such. In part, this may be due to the
predominance of lawyers in framing reparations issues and the
predominance of economists and engineers in the development
world.
Post-conflict work also involves merging the different
perspectives of conflict prevention, humanitarian assistance, human
rights monitoring and traditional development cultures, each with its
own "turf," time frame and policy prescriptions. Development aid
involves different, often shorter-term and more measurable goals
than moral and social reconstruction. "[Ilt is easier to rebuild roads
and bridges than it is to reconstruct institutions and strengthen the
social fabric of a society. '6 It is also easier to quantify payback
periods and break-even points in the former enterprise than the
latter. On the other hand, "transitional justice" and other
organizations focused on reconciliation, justice and rights
enhancement have often given short shrift to economic, social and
cultural rights, and have tended to avoid confronting complex
economic development issues in favor of a political institution-
building approach.
A reparations perspective might also be considered interference
67. WORLD BANK GROUP, supra note 63, 1 2.
68. WORLD BANK GROUP, CONFLICT PREVENTION AND POST-CONFLICT
RECONSTRUCTION: PERSPECTIVES AND PROSPECTS 8 (1998), available at
<http://wblnOO18.worldbank.org/Networks/ESSD/icdb.nsf/D4856F1l2E805DF485256
6C9007C27A6/B86BCB448FOC5E9E85256849007831ED/$FILE/ParisReport.pdf>
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in the political affairs of a state, something prohibited by the World
Bank's Articles of Agreement. 9 To the extent that local residents,
and not just identified victims, benefit from projects, this problem
would be mitigated. Most importantly, the kind of market-opening,
social service-restricting, large project development often espoused
by agencies like the World Bank and the IMF may actually run
counter to the local-level, service-providing, participatory focus of a
reparations policy. In this sense, microlending and similar small-scale
efforts are a better development strategy. Indeed, some microlending
projects already target special groups like returnees, displaced
persons and refugees and demobilized soldiers for loans; it would
take little to extend such programs to widows or to victims more
generally.7" Such small-scale projects may more easily integrate
development into a reparations perspective-and reparations into a
development plan.
B. Reparations as Community-Level Acknowledgement and
Community Service
Reparations after genocide or mass conflict are only a small part
of a larger social reconstruction agenda. That agenda includes
prosecutions, disclosure of the nature, pattern, extent and
consequences of the violations, cleansing of those responsible from
positions of public trust, structural changes to avoid repetition and
commemoration. All these things are more difficult where there are
thousands of victims and thousands of perpetrators, including many
who, egged on by military or civilian leaders and organizers, turned
against their neighbors. In these mass conflict situations (as opposed
to those where a tightly controlled state apparatus targeted its real or
imagined enemies) traditional court prosecutions and traditional
individualized reparations have seemed equally impossible or, at the
least, inadequate. While prosecutions (national, international or
transnational) may be appropriate, indeed necessary, for the leaders,
organizers and enthusiastic practitioners of genocide or crimes against
humanity, sufficient resources are not available to try everyone. The
69. WORLD BANK GROUP, DEVELOPMENT & HUMAN RIGHTS: THE ROLE OF THE
WORLD BANK, Introduction, at <http://worldbank.orglhtml/extdr/rights/hrintro.htm>
(visited Jan. 6, 2003). Admittedly, the Bank has come a long way towards
recognizing "rights-based" approaches to its work.
70. Karen Doyle, Microfinance in the Wake of Conflict. Challenges and
Opportunities, THE SEEP NETWORK, July 1998, at 13-20, available at <www.mip.org/
pdfs/mbp/ conflict.pdf>.
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administrative difficulties, and the line-drawing problems involved in
deciding who is, and who is not, worthy of reparations, are equally
formidable. In a number of these situations, the new, post-conflict
governments have turned to quasi-traditional mechanisms to provide
some measure of justice while fostering the reintegration of low-level
offenders into local communities. Although discussed mainly in
terms of punishment, such quasi-traditional mechanisms have a clear
reparatory element, one which could be further emphasized and
developed.
In Rwanda, the post-genocide government decided that it was
committed to prosecuting those involved in the genocide. Over the
next few years, the jail population climbed to over 130,000 people.
While for many there was considerable evidence that they had
committed awful crimes, for others there was no dossier at all and no
evidence they had done more than be at the wrong place at the wrong
time. Although the Rwandan courts made valiant efforts, and the
ICTR made plans to try a few dozen of the top leaders and
organizers, it soon became clear that the local courts would not clear
up the backlog of suspects for several generations. In searching for a
solution that avoided a blanket amnesty (deemed morally, legally and
politically unacceptable) the government opted to revive the gacaca
system of traditional justice, under which village elders met and
resolved low-level disputes through reconciliation, normally including
an act of restoration or reparation by the perpetrator having been
agreed upon by the victim, perpetrator and community members.
Offenders, except those classified as leaders and organizers, may be
presented to the gacaca courts. The system consists of some 254,000
courts, with lay judges elected by the population at the cell (village)
and sector levels as persons of honesty and integrity (at higher levels,
judges are appointed and have some legal training). They will hear
testimony from the assembled villagers on the participation of
suspects, and may sentence them to jail time or, in the case of
property crimes, to compensatory payments. The emphasis is on
restoring some of the damage done to the community; the public
hearings will also allow for truth-telling, confrontation of victims and
accused, opportunities for acts of contrition and apology on the part
of perpetrators and acceptance by victims. This may be especially
important to provide a way for atonement for both killers and for
witnesses who were unable or unwilling to try to stop the killings.71 It
71. Gacaca Justice: A Shared Responsibility, AFR. RTs. BUREAU RWANDA, Jan.
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may therefore have moral reparations aspects as well.
In Rwanda, as in most civil law countries, compensation may be
claimed as an adjunct to the criminal trial. This raised the question of
whether gacaca courts would be able to award compensation to
victims. The law creating these courts envisions a sui generis process:
during the public village hearing, civil claimants can make their case
for compensation, and the accused, or others, can present arguments
against the civil claim. The gacaca judges are to draw up a list of
victims who suffered material losses or bodily harm, and create an
inventory (including amount) of losses according to a schedule set out
by law. This list is to be forwarded to a compensation fund, which
will be in charge of implementation. The compensation fund is to be
financed by a combination of state funds, voluntary foreign
contributions, reparations claimed from individual offenders in the
regular criminal trials and profit from community service works.
Because the amounts awarded by thousands of gacaca courts may
well exceed the amount collected for the fund, the fund's board can
draw up a scale of payments, and payments may be made in
decreasing installments.
7
If the suspect (except for leaders and organizers) confesses, half
the sentence may be converted to a community service order; for
lesser offenders the whole sentence may be replaced by community
service. A draft decree on community service creates "Committees
for Community Service" which will place prisoners in host
institutions. Community service may involve rebuilding destroyed
schools, houses or clinics, maintenance work on buildings, roads or
gardens, crop cultivation to feed the prison population, educational
and motivational activities, first aid or personal care. Thus, a form of
collective reparations would replace punishment.
Ideally, this will be of benefit to both victims and perpetrators,
and thus encourage the social reconstruction of community life.
There are a few potential drawbacks: while the labor may be free,
many building and maintenance materials still have to come from
somewhere, and it is not clear adequate state resources will be
available. Moreover, in the specific case of Rwanda, community
2003. The material on the operation of reparations in the gacaca courts is drawn
from Stef Vandeginste, Victims of Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity, and War
Crimes in Rwanda: The Legal and Institutional Framework of Their Right to
Reparation, in POLITICS AND THE PAST: ON REPAIRING HISTORICAL INJUSTICES,
supra note 3, at 249, 261.
72. Vandeginste, supra note 71, at 263.
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service by mostly Hutu offenders may reawaken memories of old
injustices, when Belgian colonialists imposed forced labor, uburetwa,
on the mostly Hutu peasantry.73 In some areas of the country, there
are few survivors and a high percentage of the population
participated in the slaughter; in other areas, the 1994 community no
longer exists as people have moved around too much. Here, it is not
clear enough judges with clean hands can be found, or that the
population will know the defendants or will adequately participate.
Even in other areas of the country, voluntary participation in a time-
consuming communal judging may peter out as the demands of daily
survival take precedence. These limitations will impact the potential
for both moral and material reparations.
In East Timor, widespread looting and burning, along with
murder and rape, accompanied the rampage of pro-Indonesia militias
after the Timorese voted for independence in 1999. The vote itself
was a result of years of repressive acts and human rights violations by
the Indonesian military since its 1974 annexation of the island nation.
After the United Nations took over temporary administration of the
country in preparation for the first national elections, a Commission
for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation was formed to assist in
reconciliation. The Commission has the normal truth-seeking,
statement-taking and report-writing functions, but it contains a
significant innovation. Those who committed less-serious crimes
(theft, minor assault, house-burning, stealing or destroying crops or
animals) may approach the Commission and ask it to convene a
meeting of the perpetrator, victims and local community members.
These parties are to discuss the crimes and propose an agreement
whereby the perpetrator does community work, makes a repayment
or public apology or undertakes some other act of reconciliation.
Once this process is completed, the district court is to enter an order
that those acts cannot be prosecuted or subjected to civil liability in
the future, and the community is to agree that the perpetrator may
return to the community without fear. Failure to fulfill the agreement
is itself a criminal offense punishable by up to one year's
imprisonment, a fine or both, while failure to apply to the commission
process leaves the offender at risk of future prosecution. The process
is headed by twenty-five to thirty regional commissioners, who are
persons of high moral caliber selected by a representative panel on
the basis of over three hundred recommendations. Serious crimes,
73. Id. at 261-62.
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including rape, murder, organizing or planning crimes and crimes
against humanity are dealt with separately, by a Serious Criminal
Offenses Panel.74
By June 2003, 860 perpetrators had voluntarily provided
statements to the Commission, and reconciliation hearings had been
held involving 201 of them. Most perpetrators have been low-level
members of militias. The public hearing at the village is the
culmination of three months of preparatory work by the Commission,
which moves from one sub-district to another identifying
communities where the process is relevant, explaining the process to
potential deponents and victims, assisting them in taking statements,
sending the statements to the Office of the Prosecutor General for
approval and working with the community to prepare for hearings.
The hearings have been ceremonial affairs making extensive use of
traditional symbols and rituals, including traditional lawgivers.
Before a panel of community elders and the assembled village,
including the victims, those seeking reintegration tell their story and
respond to questions. Victims then are able to respond, and
negotiations ensue over appropriate reparatory acts. In the hearings
to date, these have ranged from a formal apology, to payment in
livestock, traditional fabric, coins and liquor. In several cases, the
deponents agreed to work repairing a school (together with the victim
after he volunteered to help) or building or maintaining a church. In
a few cases, victims and deponents were unable to reconcile.
Kieran Dwyer observed a November "community reconciliation
process" involving thirty-one deponents. 5  He reported that the
hearing was a festive occasion, with active participation by local
community members and the panel, and the regional commissioner
playing a facilitative role. The deponents spoke first and answered
questions; then the victims spoke. The woman panel member was
careful to invite women as well as men to participate. Then the floor
was opened to the public. At one point, new information from a
community member suggested that one of the deponents had in fact
been involved in a murder, and as a result the process was suspended
for him until the information could be pursued. Finally, the panel
74. Information about the Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation
in East Timor is available online at <www.easttimor-reconciliation.org> (visited Jan.
20, 2004).
75. COMMISSION FOR RECEPTION, TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION IN EAST TIMOR,
Updates on Progress, June-July 2003 Update, at <www.easttimor-reconciliation.org/
Updates.htm>.
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deliberated on appropriate acts of reconciliation; some negotiation
ensued; and when everyone was satisfied, the traditional adat
ceremonies were performed, everyone embraced and the proceedings
ended. According to Dwyer, "[d]eeply embedded in the strong local
culture and custom, community members affirmed that this process
had real meaning for their lives-that it was important for them to
publicly acknowledge what had happened in the community and to
deal with the rift that had divided them.,
76
These types of local-level community reconciliation programs
might prove an effective form of reparations in situations where there
are many low-level perpetrators, where victims and perpetrators (and
everything in between) must coexist, where the power disparities
between victims and perpetrators are relatively small and where
neither the state nor the perpetrators has the resources to pay
monetary compensation. They seem especially appropriate in
reasonably intact rural communities and more difficult to apply in
urban areas or areas with displaced people. These programs seem
especially appealing because of the emphasis on moral reparations to
the community as a whole, recognition that wrong was done both to
individual victims and to the fabric of community life. Other
attractive features include the perpetrators' public recognition and
atonement for their wrongs, and the involvement of the whole
community in the process of hearing and challenging the
defendant/deponent's story and in the ultimate resolution and
reintegration. The themes of allowing victims to confront those who
harmed them, apology and atonement and positive or restorative
justice as superior to a punitive model are all present in these efforts.
And yet, the primary focus is not on reparations, but on
punishment (Rwanda) and reconciliation (East Timor). There is a
danger that issues of reparation could be short-changed, or that
victims could feel pressured not to demand too much from
perpetrators in order not to get in the way of community
reconciliation. There may also be certain cultural preconditions for
such programs. In East Timor, for example, a culture of valuing
community unity and harmony over individual rights may be more
salient than, say, in Bosnia or in Latin America. Cultural
determinants may limit the applicability of these kinds of community
76. COMMISSION FOR RECEPTION, TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION IN EAST TIMOR,
Updates on Progress, Oct.-Nov. 2002 Update, at <www.easttimor-reconciliation.org/
Updates.htm>.
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service/reconciliation programs.
Finally, community reparations programs like these will work
well only where there is a sense that the higher-ups are being
adequately dealt with elsewhere. If reparations programs, however
well-intentioned, are seen as a tradeoff for a lack of justice in cases of
crimes against humanity, they will be unlikely to serve any of the
purposes for which they are designed.77
C. Reparations as Preferential Access
A third way of thinking about reparations after genocide or mass
conflict involves providing preferential access to services and public
goods to victims as they become available: a "go-to-the-head-of-the-
line" approach. Thus, special budget allocations for individual
reparations are not necessary, but victims' extraordinary suffering is
recognized. From a position of ostracism and marginalization, the
victims' position as worthy members of society is restored and
acknowledged, through priority access to government services such as
state-subsidized or state-built housing, education, public
transportation passes and the like.
The paradigmatic preferential access regime rewards veterans for
service to their country. About 2.7 million U.S. veterans receive
disability compensation or pension from the U.S. Veterans
Administration, as do over half a million surviving spouses and
children. The G.I. Bill allowed thousands of U.S. veterans to obtain
free or low-cost education and training, unemployment assistance and
housing. Veterans hospitals provide access to free or low-cost
medical care according to a schedule of "priority groups," while "Vet
Centers" provide psychological counseling for war-related trauma.
Veterans obtain special preferences for low-cost housing loan
guarantees and in employment; they get extra points on civil service
examinations (for government jobs) and preferential job counseling
services. Under the Veterans' Job Training Act, the state pays an
employer half a veteran's entry level wages up to nine months (fifteen
months for a partially disabled vet). Veterans can be buried in special
77. This may be the situation in Colombia, where the government has proposed
an amnesty law for paramilitary groups that provide information or undertake
actions that would contribute to providing victims' reparations, to ending the conflict
or to achieving peace. The law is available online at <www.presidencia.gov.co/
documentos/framdoc.htm> (visited Jan. 20, 2004). See also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,
Colombia's Checkbook Impunity: A Briefing Paper (Sept. 22, 2003), at
<hrw.org/backgrounder/americas/checkbook-impunity.htm>.
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cemeteries. Other countries have similar veterans' preferences."8
It takes only a small leap of the imagination to analogize the risks
and burdens borne by veterans to those borne by victims of state
repression or targeted by genocidaires. Like veterans, victims of mass
atrocity have made extraordinary sacrifices; they arguably deserve a
privileged place in rebuilding society. Indeed, in the Gorbachev-era
Soviet Union, many cities awarded survivors of the gulag the
privileges enjoyed by veterans, including the right to shop in special
stores, free passage on local transport and priority access to better
housing and medical care."
The approach in practice may not differ much from a
"reparations as development" paradigm, but the underlying rationale
is focused on repairing individual harms and at foregrounding
recognition that the society owes a debt to victims. It also allows an
emphasis on the educational and health benefits that victims and
survivors seem to value most highly, and less focus on more
controversial monetary compensation. It does not confuse the state's
obligation to all inhabitants to provide infrastructure and public
services with its separate obligation to remedy past harms to some.
It does entail certain risks and drawbacks: if a large enough
percentage of the population qualifies as "victims," there may be little
point to being toward the front of a very long line for services. It is
also unclear how long such programs should last before the debt is
paid, and what kind of administrative apparatus would be needed to
register the individual's special status. More fundamentally, a
preference-based approach can create new resentments and a sense
of victimization among those who are not the beneficiaries of
preferences-witness the affirmative-action debate in the United
States, South Africa, India and elsewhere. What's more, in some
circumstances, victims may not want to have to publicly identify
78. DEP'T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, Federal Benefits for Veterans and Dependents
(2003), available at <www.va.gov/OPA/feature>; VETERANS RESOURCE
CONNECTION, A Short History of Veterans' Benefits, at
<http://dlir.state.hi.us/wdd/vets/benefits/ history.html> (visited Jan. 6, 2003); DEP'T OF
VETERANS AFFAIRS, Facts about the Department of Veterans Affairs (Mar. 2002),
available at <www.va.gov/pressrel/vafacts.htm>. France provides the benefit of
French nationality to those who spend three years in the French foreign legion.
EMBASSY OF FRANCE IN THE UNITED STATES, French Foreign Legion (Feb. 26, 2001),
at <www.info-france-usa.org/atoz/legion/misc.asp>.
79. Kathleen E. Smith, Destalinization in the Former Soviet Union, in IMPUNITY
AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 33, at 113,
117.
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themselves as such in order to get access to services. It is hard to
imagine, for example, Tutsi victims of the Rwandan genocide wanting
to carry any identification giving them preferential access to
government services, after identification cards with ethnic identity
marked in them served as death warrants during the 1994 genocide.
Conclusion
States may combine elements of these three approaches to
reparations in cases of mass violence. Rwanda's Compensation Fund,
for example, contemplates payment in services as well as cash. One
could imagine preferential access to microcredit as a combination
approach.
Much will depend on the specific culture and the relationships
among organized state power, perpetrators and victims. The use of
one or more of these three approaches should keep the focus on
inclusion, moral reparation, community-level solutions and access to
necessary resources.
A constant under all these approaches is the need to involve the
victims and their organizations in discussions about what reparations,
like other post-conflict strategies, should look like. They should be
an important voice, but it is also critical to involve the larger
community in discussions about what form reparations should take.
Reparations are also part of a larger, multifaceted approach to
post-conflict justice and social reconstruction, and should be seen
within that context. Reparations may be the most tangible and visible
expression of both acknowledgement and change, and in that sense
an important contributor to reconciliation and social reconstruction.
They also serve as a bridge between the notions of reparatory and
distributive justice, between the spheres of political/moral life and
economic well-being. Much empirical research on the effects of
different kinds of reparations policies on victims, perpetrators and the
larger society remains to be done before we can pinpoint the
contribution of reparations to the larger goals of peace, justice and
equity. It will take a good deal of experimentation and flexibility, as
well as adherence to the principle that reparations must eventually be
provided to victims of mass violence, to find the right approach for
each society.
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APPENDIX
DRAFT
BASIC PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES
ON THE RIGHT TO A REMEDY AND REPARATION
FOR VICTIMS OF [GROSS] VIOLATIONS
OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
AND [SERIOUS] VIOLATIONS
OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW
(Rev. 24 October 2003)
Background
The Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and
Protection of Minorities, in its resolution 1989/13, decided to entrust
the Special Rapporteur, Mr. Theo van Boven, with the task of
undertaking a study concerning the right to restitution, compensation
and rehabilitation for victims of gross violations of human rights and
fundamental freedoms. In 1993, Mr. van Boven submitted the study
in his final report, to the Sub-Commission (E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/8).
The Commission on Human Rights, in its resolution 1994/35,
welcomed the study and regarded the proposed basic principles and
guidelines contained in the study of the Special Rapporteur as a
useful basis for giving priority to the question of restitution,
compensation and rehabilitation. In accordance with the Sub-
Commission resolution 1996/28, the Secretary-General transmitted to
the Commission the revised draft basic principles and guidelines
prepared by Mr. van Boven (E/CN.4/1997/104, annex).
In accordance with Commission resolution 1998/43, Mr. M.
Cherif Bassiouni was appointed as independent expert to prepare a
revised version of the draft basic principles and guidelines, taking into
account the views and comments provided by States,
intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations. In its
resolution 1999/33, the Commission noted with appreciation the
report of the independent expert (E/CN.4/1999/65). In 2000, Mr.
Bassiouni submitted the final report containing a revised version of
the basic principles and guidelines (E/CN.4/2000/62) to the
Commission at its fifty-sixth session. In preparing the revised version
of the principles and guidelines, the independent expert benefited
from the foundation provided by prior reports as well as comments
made by various Member States, intergovernmental and non-
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governmental organizations. Additionally, Mr. Bassiouni held two
consultative meetings in Geneva for all interested Member States,
intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations and
comments made during those meetings were taken into account in
formulating the principles and guidelines.
On the basis of Commission resolutions 2000/41 and 2002/44, the
Office of High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) circulated
the text of the principles and guidelines and comments were received
from Member States, intergovernmental and non-governmental
organizations.
In accordance with Commission resolution 2002/44, OHCHR
convened, with the cooperation of the Government of Chile, an
international consultation in Geneva for all interested Member
States, intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations, with
a view to finalizing the principles and guidelines (E/CN.4/2000/62).
The consultation was chaired by Mr. Alejandro Salinas (Chile), and
benefited from the expert guidance of the mandated authors of the
principles and guidelines, Mr. van Boven and Mr. Bassiouni.
Following presentations by two experts, the participants at the
consultation reviewed the draft principles and guidelines and
discussed follow-up to the consultative meeting. The Chairperson-
Rapporteur submitted to the Commission at its fifty-ninth session a
report on the consultative meeting, inter alia recommending that the
Commission on Human Rights establish an appropriate and effective
mechanism with the objective of finalizing the elaboration of the set
of "Basic principles and guidelines on the right to a remedy and
reparation for victims of gross violations of international human
rights and humanitarian law."
In its resolution 2003/34, the Commission took note of the report
of the Chairperson-Rapporteur of the consultative meeting
(E/CN.4/2003/63).
In accordance with Commission resolution 2003/34, the
Chairperson-Rapporteur of the consultative meeting, in consultation
with the independent experts, Mr. van Boven and Mr. Bassiouni,
prepared a revised version of the "Basic principles and guidelines on
the right to a remedy and reparation for victims of violations of
international human rights and humanitarian law," taking into
account the opinions and commentaries of States and of
intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations and the
results of the consultative meeting.
In resolution 2003/34, the Commission further requested the
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OHCHR to hold, with the cooperation of interested Governments, a
second consultative meeting for all interested Member States,
intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations with a view
to finalizing the "Basic principles and guidelines on the right to a
remedy and reparation for victims of violations of international
human rights and humanitarian law" and, if appropriate, to consider
options for the adoption of these principles and guidelines. The
second consultative meeting should have, as a basis for its work, the
comments submitted, the report of the Chairperson-Rapporteur of
the first consultative meeting, and the revised version of the
principles and guidelines prepared by the Chairperson-Rapporteur of
the first consultative meeting in consultation with the independent
experts.
On the, basis of the above resolution the Chairperson-
Rapporteur and the independent experts met in Geneva on 4, 5 and 6
August 2003 to revise the text in accordance with comments and
observations received by Governments. The revised text, dated 15
August 2003, was reviewed by Governments, intergovernmental
organizations and non-governmental organizations at the second
consultative meeting held in Geneva from 20 to 23 October 2003.
The comments made during the first two days of meeting, 20 and 21
October 2003, were incorporated by the Chairperson-Rapporteur and
the two independent experts into the text which was reviewed further
during the last day of the meeting on 23 October 2003.
The following is the revised text of the principles and guidelines,
dated 24 October 2003, which also incorporates comments and
suggestions made during the last day of the second consultative
meeting.
Preamble
The Commission on Human Rights,
Recalling the provisions providing a right to a remedy for victims
of violations of international human rights law found in numerous
international instruments, in particular the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights at article 8, the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights at article 2, the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination at article 6, the
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment at article 14, the Convention on the Rights
of the Child at article 39, and of humanitarian law as found in article 3
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of the Hague Convention of 18 October 1907 concerning the Laws
and Customs of War and Land (Convention No. IV of 1907) and
article 91 of Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12
August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of
International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I),
Recalling the provisions providing a right to a remedy for victims
of violations of international human rights found in regional
conventions, in particular the African Charter on Human and
Peoples' Rights at article 7, the American Convention on Human
Rights at article 25, and the European Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms at article 13,
Recalling the Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for
Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power emanating from the
deliberations of the Seventh United Nations Congress on the
Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, and resolution
40/34 of 29 November 1985 by which the General Assembly adopted
the text recommended by the Congress,
Reaffirming the principles enunciated in the Declaration of Basic
Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power,
including that victims should be treated with compassion and respect
for their dignity, have their right to access to justice and redress
mechanisms fullyrespected, and that the establishment, strengthening
and expansion of national funds for compensation to victims should
be encouraged, together with the expeditious development of
appropriate rights and remedies for victims,
Recalling resolution 1989/57 of 24 May 1989 of the Economic and
Social Council, entitled "Implementation of the Declaration of Basic
Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power," as
well as Council resolution 1990/22 of 24 May 1990, entitled "Victims
of crime and abuse of power,"
Noting that in resolution 827 (1993) of 25 May 1993 in which it
adopted the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia, the Security Council decided that "the work of
the International Tribunal shall be carried out without prejudice to
the right of the victims to seek, through appropriate means,
compensation for damages incurred as a result of violations of
international humanitarian law,"
Noting also that the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court requires the establishment of "principles relating to reparation
to, or in respect of, victims, including restitution, compensation and
rehabilitation" and requires the Assembly of States Parties to
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establish a trust fund for the benefit of victims of covered crimes
within the purview of the Court and of the families of such victims,
and mandates the Court "to protect the safety, physical and
psychological well-being, dignity and privacy of victims" and to
permit the participation of victims at all "stages of the proceedings
determined to be appropriate by the Court,"
Considering that the principles and guidelines contained herein
are directed at gross violations of civil, political, economic, social and
cultural rights, which include the protection of life, physical integrity
and other aspects essential to the human person and to human
dignity,
Emphasizing that the principles and guidelines do not create new
substantive international or domestic legal obligations but identify
mechanisms, modalities, procedures and methods for the
implementation of existing legal obligations under international
human rights law and international humanitarian law which are
complementary though different as to their norms,
Recalling that international law contains the obligation to
prosecute perpetrators of certain international crimes in accordance
with treaty obligations assumed by States Parties and the
requirements of national law or as provided for in the applicable
statutes of international judicial organs, and that the duty to
prosecute reinforces the international legal obligations to be carried
out in accordance with national legal requirements and procedures
and supports the concept of complementarity,
Noting that international human rights law and international
humanitarian law have developed along separate legal and historic
tracks which nevertheless overlap in some respects and provide
complementary protections of victims, though not necessarily in the
same manner or using the same terminology,
Noting also that conflicts of a non-international character as well
as internal disturbances and tensions that have occurred since the
Second World War reveal that a high level of victimization has
occurred at the hands of non-State actors and that the victims of
violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law
require the same protections as other victims, not only on the basis of
principles of State responsibility but also on the basis of social and
human solidarity,
Noting further that the recognition of the rights of victims and
providing for substantive and procedural remedies arise as a
consequence of violations of international law irrespective of the
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specific sources of law applicable to the rights of victims,
Noting that international human rights law and international
humanitarian law are complementary, though separate and distinct
bodies of international law and that the recognition of the substantive
and procedural remedies for victims contained in the present
document are not intended to be construed as commingling the two
bodies of law and moreover that the recognition of victims'
substantive and procedural remedies does not prejudge or affect the
norms applicable under these two bodies of international law nor
their substantive and procedural content,
Noting also, as established in the Declaration of Basic Principle
of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power, that victims of
serious abuses of political and economic power are entitled to the
protection of their rights like other victims,
Noting further that, contemporary forms of victimization, while
essentially directed against individuals, may nevertheless also be
directed against classes of persons or identifiable groups of persons
who are targeted collectively, and who should also be entitled to the
protection of their collective rights and to engage in collective legal
action to secure the rights of collective groups,
Recognizing that, in honouring the victims' right to benefit from
remedies and reparation, the international community keeps faith
and human solidarity with victims, survivors and future human
generations, and reaffirms the international legal principles of
accountability, justice and the rule of law,
Convinced that, in adopting a victim-oriented perspective, the
international community affirms its human solidarity and compassion
with victims of violations of international law, including violations of
international human rights and humanitarian law, as well as with
humanity at large,
Decides to adopt the Basic Principles and Guidelines on the
Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of [Gross] Violations
of International Human Rights and [Serious] Violations of
Humanitarian Law as follows:
I. Obligation to Respect, Ensure Respect for and Enforce
International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law
1. The obligation of each State to respect, ensure respect for and
enforce international human rights and humanitarian law
applicable to it pertains to norms that are, inter alia:
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(a) Contained in treaties to which a State is a party;
(b) Found in customary international law; or
(c) Contained in a State's domestic law.
2. To that end, if they have not already done so, States shall
ensure that their domestic law is consistent with their
international legal obligations by:
(a) Incorporating norms of international human rights and
humanitarian law into their domestic law, or otherwise
implementing them in their domestic legal system;
(b) Adopting appropriate and effective legislative and
administrative procedures and other appropriate
measures that provide fair, effective and prompt
access to justice;
(c) Making available adequate, effective, prompt, and
appropriate procedural and substantive remedies,
including reparation, as defined below; and
(d) Ensuring, in the case that there is a difference between
a State's national requirements and its international
legal obligations, that the requirement or obligation
that provides the greatest degree of protection to the
victim is applied.
II. Scope of the Obligation
3. The obligation to respect, ensure respect for and enforce its
international human rights and humanitarian law obligations
includes, inter alia, the duty to:
(a) Take appropriate legislative and administrative and
other appropriate measures to prevent violations;
(b) Investigate violations effectively, promptly, thoroughly
and impartially and, where appropriate, take action
against the alleged perpetrator in accordance with
domestic and international law;
(c) Provide those who claim to be victims of a human
rights or humanitarian law violation with equal and
effective access to justice, as described below,
irrespective of who may ultimately be the bearer of
responsibility for the violation; and
(d) Afford effective, prompt and appropriate procedural
and substantive remedies to victims, including
20041
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
providing and facilitating reparation to victims, as
defined below.
III. Gross Violations of International Human Rights and
Serious Violations of Humanitarian Law that Constitute
Crimes Under International Law
4. Those gross violations of international human rights and
serious violations of humanitarian law that constitute crimes
under international law require the duty to investigate and, if
there is sufficient evidence, the duty to prosecute the person
alleged to have committed the violations and, if found guilty,
the duty to punish the perpetrator. Moreover, in these cases,
States shall cooperate with one another and assist
international judicial organs competent in the investigation
and prosecution of these violations.
5. To that end, where so provided in an applicable treaty or
under other international obligation, States shall incorporate
and otherwise implement within their domestic law
appropriate provisions, consistent with applicable
international law, providing for universal jurisdiction.
Moreover, where it is so provided for in an applicable treaty
or other international legal obligation, States shall facilitate
extradition or surrender of offenders to other States and to
appropriate international judicial bodies and provide judicial
assistance and other forms of cooperation in the pursuit of
international justice, including assistance to and protection of
victims and witnesses, consistent with international human
rights legal standards and subject to international legal
requirements such as those relating to the prohibition of
torture and other forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment.
IV. Statutes of Limitations
6. Where so provided for in an applicable treaty or contained in
another international legal obligation, statutes of limitations
shall not apply to violations of international human rights and
humanitarian law which constitute crimes under international
law.
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7. Domestic statutes of limitations for other types of violations
that do not constitute crimes against international law,
including those time limitations applicable to civil claims and
other procedures, should not be unduly restrictive,
procedurally or in other ways, so as to deprive the victim of
pursuing a claim against the perpetrator or any other body or
entity. Moreover, statutes of limitations shall not be applied
to periods during which no effective remedies exist for gross
violations of human rights and serious violations of
humanitarian law.
V. Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights
and Serious Violations of Humanitarian Law
8. For purposes of this document, a victim is a person or a
collective group of persons who suffered harm, including
physical or mental injury, emotional suffering, economic loss,
or impairment of their fundamental legal rights. A "victim"
may also be a legal personality, the representative of a victim,
a dependant, a member of the immediate family or household
of the direct victim, as well as a person who, in intervening to
assist a victim or prevent the occurrence of further violations,
suffered physical, mental, or economic harm.
9. For the purposes of this document, a victim as defined above
is one who suffers harm as a result of acts or omissions that
constitute a gross violation of international human rights, or
serious violations of humanitarian law.
10. A person's status as a "victim" should not depend on any
relationship that may exist or may have existed between the
victim and the perpetrator, or whether the perpetrator of the
violation has been identified, apprehended, prosecuted, or
convicted.
VI. Treatment of Victims
11. Victims should be treated by the State and, where applicable,
by other entities or groups whether public or private, with
compassion and respect for their dignity and human rights,
and appropriate measures should be taken to ensure their
safety, physical and psychological well- being and privacy, as
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well as those of their families. The State should ensure that its
domestic laws, to the extent possible, provide that a victim
who has suffered violence or trauma should benefit from
special consideration and care to avoid his or her
retraumatization in the course of legal and administrative
procedures designed to provide justice and reparation.
VII. Victims' Right to Substantive and Procedural Remedies
12. Remedies for gross violations of international human rights
and serious violations of humanitarian law include the victim's
right to the following, whose contents are described below,
namely:
(a) Access to justice;
(b) Reparation for harm suffered and other appropriate
remedy; and
(c) Access to factual information and other relevant
information concerning the violations.
VIII. Access to Justice
13. A victim of a gross violation of human rights or of a serious
violation of humanitarian law shall have effective access to a
judicial remedy. Other remedies available to the victim
include access to administrative and other bodies, as well as
mechanisms, modalities and proceedings conducted in
accordance with domestic law. A victim's right of effective
access to justice also extends to international proceedings as
provided by international law. Obligations arising under
international law to secure the individual or collective right to
access justice and fair and impartial proceedings shall be
reflected in domestic laws. To that end, States should:
(a) Disseminate, through public and private mechanisms,
all available remedies for violations of gross
international human rights and serious violations of
humanitarian law;
(b) Take measures to minimize the inconvenience to
victims and their representatives, protect their privacy
as appropriate and ensure their safety from
intimidation and retaliation, as well as that of their
families and witnesses, before, during and after
judicial, administrative, or other proceedings that
affect the interests of victims;
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(c) Facilitate assistance to victims seeking access to
justice;
(d) Make available all appropriate diplomatic and legal
means to ensure that victims can exercise their rights
to a substantive and procedural remedy for violations
of international human rights or humanitarian law.
14. In addition to individual access to justice, States should
endeavour to develop procedures to allow groups of victims to
present collective claims for reparation and to receive
reparation collectively, as appropriate.
15. Adequate, effective and prompt remedy against a gross
violation of international human rights or serious violations of
humanitarian law should include all available and appropriate
international processes in which an individual may have legal
standing and should be without prejudice to any other
domestic remedies.
IX. Reparation for Harm Suffered or Other Appropriate
Remedy
16. Adequate, effective and prompt reparation is intended to
promote justice by redressing gross violations of international
human rights or serious violations of humanitarian law.
Reparation should be proportional to the gravity of the
violations and the harm suffered. In accordance with its
domestic laws and international legal obligations, a State shall
provide reparation to victims for its acts or omissions
constituting gross violations of international human rights and
serious violations of humanitarian law. In cases where a
person, a legal personality, or other entity is found liable for
reparation to a victim, the party responsible for the violation
should provide reparation to the victim, or to the State if the
State has already provided reparation to the victim.
17. In the event that the party responsible for the violation is
unable or unwilling to meet these obligations, the State should
endeavour to provide assistance, including reparations as
defined below, to victims who have sustained bodily injury or
impairment of physical or mental health as a result of these
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violations and to the families, in particular, dependants of
persons who have died or become physically or mentally
incapacitated as a result of the violation. To that end, States
should endeavour to establish national programmes for
reparation and other assistance to victims.
18. A State shall enforce its domestic judgements for reparation
against individuals or entities responsible for the violations
and shall endeavour to enforce valid foreign legal judgements
for reparation against individuals or entities responsible for
the violations. To that end, States shall provide under their
domestic laws effective mechanisms for the enforcement of
reparation judgements.
19. In cases where the State or Government under whose
authority the violation occurred is no longer in existence, the
State or Government successor in title should provide
reparation to the victims.
20. In accordance with domestic law and international law, and
taking account of individual circumstances, victims of gross
violations of international human rights and serious violations
of humanitarian law should be provided, as appropriate and
proportional to the violation and the circumstances of each
case, with the following forms of reparation: restitution,
compensation, rehabilitation and satisfaction and guarantees
of non-repetition.
21. Restitution should, whenever possible, restore the victim to
the original situation before the violations of international
human rights or humanitarian law occurred. Restitution
includes, as appropriate: restoration of liberty, legal rights,
social status, identity, family life and citizenship, return to
one's place of residence, restoration of employment and
return of property.
22. Compensation should be provided for any economically
assessable damage, as appropriate and proportional to the
violation and the circumstances of each case, resulting from
gross violations of international human rights and serious
violations of humanitarian law, such as:
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(a) Physical or mental harm, including pain, suffering and
emotional distress;
(b) Lost opportunities, including employment, education
and social benefits;
(c) Material damages and loss of earnings, including loss
of earning potential;
(d) Harm to reputation or dignity; and
(e) Costs required for legal or expert assistance, medicines
and medical services, and psychological and social
services.
23. Rehabilitation should include, as appropriate, medical and
psychological care as well as legal and social services.
24. Satisfaction should include, where applicable and as
appropriate, any or all of the following:
(a) Cessation of continuing violations;
(b) Verification of the facts and full and public disclosure
of the truth to the extent that such disclosure does not
cause further unnecessary harm or threaten the safety
of the victim, witnesses, or others;
(c) The search for the whereabouts of the disappeared
and for the bodies of those killed, and assistance in the
recovery, identification and reburial of the bodies in
accordance with the cultural practices of the families
and communities;
(d) An official declaration or a judicial decision restoring
the dignity, reputation and legal and social rights of
the victim and of persons closely connected with the
victim;
(e) Apology, including public acknowledgement of the
facts and acceptance of responsibility;
(f) Judicial and administrative sanctions against persons
responsible for the violations;
(g) Commemorations and tributes to the victims;
(h) Inclusion of an accurate account of the violations that
occurred in international human rights and
humanitarian law training and in educational material
at all levels.
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25. Within national legal systems, guarantees of non-repetition
and prevention should include, where applicable and as
appropriate, any or all of the following:
(a) Ensuring effective civilian control of military and
security forces;
(b) Restricting the jurisdiction of military tribunals only to
specifically military offences committed by members
of the armed forces and ensuring that all military
proceedings abide by international standards of due
process, fairness and impartiality;
(c) Strengthening the independence of the judiciary;
(d) Protecting persons in the legal, medical and health-
care professions, the media and other related
professions, and human rights defenders;
(e) Conducting and strengthening, on a priority and
continued basis, human rights and humanitarian law
training to all sectors of society, including law
enforcement officials, as well as military and security
forces;
(f) Promoting the observance of codes of conduct and
ethical norms, in particular international standards, by
public servants, including law enforcement,
correctional, media, medical, psychological, social
service and military personnel, as well as the staff of
economic enterprises;
(g) Promoting mechanisms for monitoring and preventing
inter-social conflicts and their resolution;
(h) Reviewing and reforming laws contributing to or
allowing gross violations of human rights and serious
violations of humanitarian law.
X. Access to Factual Information and Other Relevant
Information Concerning the Violations
26. States should develop means of informing the general public
and, in particular, victims of violations of international human
rights and humanitarian law of the rights and remedies
contained within these principles and guidelines and of all
available legal, medical, psychological, social, administrative
and all other services to which victims may have a right of
access. Moreover, victims and their representatives should be
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entitled to seek and obtain information on the causes leading
to their victimization and on the causes and conditions
pertaining to the gross violations of human rights and serious
violations of humanitarian law and to learn the truth in regard
to these violations.
XI. Non-Discrimination Among Victims
27. The application and interpretation of these principles and
guidelines must be consistent with internationally recognized
human rights law and humanitarian law and be without any
discrimination of any kind or grounds, Without exception.
XII. Non-Derogation
28. Nothing in these principles and guidelines shall be construed
as restricting or derogating from any rights or obligations
arising under international law.
XIII. Rights of Others
29. Nothing in this document is to be construed as derogating
from internationally or nationally protected rights of others, in
particular the right of an accused person to benefit from
international and national standards of due process.
Explanatory Comments
The following explanatory comments are made in response to
various comments and questions posed by States, intergovernmental
and non-governmental organizations in the course of various
consultations, including written comments received by the secretariat.
The preamble as well as the principles and guidelines themselves
reflect these issues. The following additional commentary on the text
is to be read in conjunction with the Chairperson-Rapporteur's report
on the discussions that took place during the course of the second
consultative meeting.
I. Nature of the Principles and Guidelines
The principles and guidelines do not create new substantive
international or domestic legal obligations. They provide for
mechanisms, modalities, procedures and methods for the
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implementation of existing legal obligations under human rights law
and international humanitarian law. At the same time, they seek to
rationalize through a consistent approach the means and methods by
which victims' rights can be addressed, so as to maximize positive
outcomes and minimize the diversity of approaches that may cause
uneven implementation. It should be noted that the fact that the
rights of victims are articulated with specificity, and their remedies
addressed with particularity, does not create new substantive legal
obligations.
2. Sources of Law and Terminological Distinctions
International human rights law and international humanitarian
law have developed along separate tracks. Their sources are in
different international conventions, as well as in separate aspects of
customary international law and general principles of law. These
multiple sources of law, even when they overlap, utilize different
terms in referring to similar protections as well as use different terms
with respect to their violation.
Insofar as the principles and guidelines are victim oriented and
are essentially predicated on the concept of social and human
solidarity and not only on the concept of State responsibility, it would
be difficult to link the rights of victims to the source of the
conventional or customary law that is at the basis of victims' rights.
Consequently, it must be understood that these principles and
guidelines are not intended to reflect the legal differences between
international human rights law violations and international
humanitarian law violations.
It is important, however, to underscore that with respect to
international human rights law violations, the principles and
guidelines are directed at what is commonly referred to as gross
violations of human rights, which involve the protection of life,
physical integrity and other matters essential to the human person
and to human dignity. This is not intended to minimize the
importance of other violations of human rights law, but merely to
distinguish those violations which, for the purposes of these principles
and guidelines, require the implementation mechanisms provided
herein.
The principles and guidelines also address separately violations
of human rights and international humanitarian law that constitute
international crimes or that require States to take measures
associated with criminal violations such as investigation, prosecution,
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punishment and international cooperation in connection with the
prosecution or punishment of alleged perpetrators. In international
humanitarian law, these violations are referred to as grave breaches
of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and Protocol I thereto,
and also as war crimes under the customary law of armed conflict.
Violations of common article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949,
and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed
Conflicts (Protocol II) are not identified in the textual language of
these conventions as either grave breaches or war crimes.
Nevertheless, customary international law, particularly after the
establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the
International Criminal Court, has recognized such violations as being
equivalent to their counterparts in conflicts of an international
character that are referred to as grave breaches and war crimes.
Other instruments of international human rights law prescribe the
criminalization of certain acts as in the case of the Convention against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, as well as with respect to different instruments relating
to international trafficking of persons for sexual exploitation and for
slavery and practices related to slavery.
Considering the range of these terminological distinctions as well
as the evolving nature of conventional and customary international
law and general principles of law with respect to the protection of the
rights of victims, the principles and guidelines have adopted a flexible
approach to avoid having to address the distinctions noted above.
3. The Duty to Prosecute
It is understood that national legal systems have different
requirements and procedures for the initiation and conduct of
criminal prosecutions. The term "duty to prosecute" is intended to
reflect the general international law obligation to proceed under
national law or in accordance with the statutes of international
judicial organs. Moreover, the concept "duty to prosecute" as used
herein is not intended to have any bearing on the concept of
complementarity between national and international legal organs,
and it also is not intended to have any bearing on theories of criminal
jurisdictions that States and international judicial organs may rely
upon.
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4. Non-State Actors
Conflicts of a non-international character, as well as internal
conflicts that have occurred since the Second World War, reveal that
a significant level of victimization has occurred at the hands of non-
State actors. In these cases, the group or groups referred to as non-
State actors have transformed themselves into the Governments of
States by assuming power. In these cases, there is a continuity
between those who had been part of the non-State actor category and
those who became the representatives of the State. It would be
incongruous in these cases to deny the victims of such non-State
actors the rights and remedies available to other victims. Another
category of non-State actor consists of groups that assume effective
control over certain territory and exercise over that territory and the
people on that territory the equivalent control exercised by States. In
some instances, these types of non-State actors receive limited
international legal recognition. There is no legal reason why such
non-State actors would be excluded either from responsibility for
their actions or for the consequences of their policies and practices
with respect to victims of these policies and practices. The intention
here is not to make States responsible for the policies and practices of
non-State actors, but to make these non-State actors responsible for
their policies and practices, while at the same time allowing victims to
seek redress on the basis of social and human solidarity and not on
the basis of State responsibility. The issue of the responsibility of
non-State actors is essentially a policy judgement.
Furthermore, the Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for
Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power provides, in paragraph 18, that
victims who have suffered "physical, or mental injury, emotional
suffering, economic loss or substantial impairment of their
fundamental rights" including, in paragraph 21, "serious abuses of
political or economic power," are entitled to victims' rights as
provided therein.
5. Collective Rights
While the principles and guidelines deal essentially with
individual rights, they do not exclude the concept of collective rights
or the rights of collectivities. The term "collective rights" includes
two aspects. The first is well established: it is where violations are
committed against a class of persons or an identifiable group, and
those who represent that class or group seek to implement or enforce
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the rights of individuals as members of that class or group. By
recognizing collective claims and class actions, States can achieve
administrative and judicial economy. In this context, the term
"collective rights" provides for a collective modality of enforcing
rights already established in a manner that enhances the capacity of
States to address these claims in a collective as opposed to an
individualized manner.
The second aspect deals with violations that are committed by
States in a manner that targets a specific group as a whole. This gives
rise to that group's ability to address procedurally its claims to a State
and receive the remedies provided for in these principles and
guidelines. Insofar as international law has not reached the level that
requires States to provide, procedurally, for the judicial exercise of
collective rights, such notions as "class action" are left to the
determination of domestic law.
6. Future Developments of International Law
Nothing in these principles and guidelines precludes the future
development of victims' collective rights under conventional and
customary international law.
7. Non-Derogation
As specified in principle XII and in principle XIII, a non-
derogation clause has been inserted as well as a provision recognizing
the rights of others as provided under international standards of due
process.
2004)

